The provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to applications for compensation made under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

JUDGMENT :

1. This is an appeal filed by Makhan Singh and his minor children, against the order dated 1st May, 1969, of Mr. Gurbachan Singh, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ludhiana, dismissing their application u/s 110 A of the Motor Vehicles Act, for grant of compensation holding that the application was barred by limitation.

2. The facts of this case are Mrs. Rasham Kaur wife of Makhan Singh Petitioner and Rup Rani sister of Resham Kaur, were going in a, rickshaw on 8th July, 1967 near the District Courts at Ludhiana at about 2.30 p.m. when Truck No. PNF 5604 belonging to Messrs Kartar Goods Transport Company, Moga, driven by Gurpal Singh Respondent came from the side of Kailash Cinema. It is alleged that the truck was driven by the driver rashly and negligently and it ran into the rickshaw in which Mrs. Resham Kaur and Mrs. Rup Rani were going and they were run over by the truck and died at the spot. Makhan Singh, the husband of Resham Kaur and Petitioner, Appellant 2 to 8 who are minor children of Makhan Singh and Resham Kaur, filed an application on 22nd February, 1968 u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act for grant of Rs. 30,000/- as compensation on the allegations that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of the truck by Gurpal Singh, Respondent No. 1 and, therefore the driver of the truck and its owner Messrs Kartar Goods Transport Company, Moga, Respondent No. 2 were liable to pay compensation. The application was also filed against the insurance Company, with whom this truck was insured, but its name was not known to the Petitioners.

3. An objection was raised by the office that the petition was barred by limitation, but inspite of this the case was registered and notices were issued to the Respondents 1 and 2. The Respondents did not appear inspite of the service and, therefore, they were proceeded ex parte. The learned Claims Tribunal, however, came to the conclusion that the accident took place on 8th July, 1967 and this application, which was filed on 22nd July, 1968, was barred by limitation, and he dismissed the same, feeling dissatisfied the Petitioners have filed this appeal to set aside the order of the Tribunal.

4. The learned Counsel for the Appellants Mr. G.S. Chawla, contended that the office had raised an objection that the petition was barred by time, but the Claims Tribunal registered this petition and issued notices to the Respondents, and therefore, he must be deemed to have condoned the delay in filing the petition, and in support of this contention he relied on Rule 4 and 5 of the Punjab Motor Accident Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964, framed by the Punjab Government, according to which when the application under Sections 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, is barred by time, the Claims Tribunal can dismissed the same summarily. This contention is devoid of force and must be rejected.

5. In this respect reference may be made to Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in Bhaskar Bhilakji Thakar v. Chhotte Lal Rai and Ors. 1967 A.C.J. 172, which is as under:

The claimant filed an application for compensation u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, after the expiry of the period of limitation. He filed an application for condonation of delay. The Claims Tribunal ordered that a notice should be issued to the Respondents to show cause why the delay should not be condoned. The claimants opposed the issue of notice to the Respondent on the ground that the Tribunal bad to determine that the application was prima facia fit to be entertained without issuing notice to the other party. It was question of condonation of delay was entirely a matter between the claimant and the Tribunal and that the Respondent has no say in this regard and therefore, once the Tribunal had taken a decision at the time of entertaining the application that it was fit for condonation of delay, the Respondents had no right to challenge the order.

Held it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to determine whether the application was goo