The main legal point established in the judgment is that the object of bail is to secure the accused's appearance at trial, and the delay in concluding the trial should be considered in bail applications.

JUDGMENT

Sudip Ahluwalia, J. - This is a petition filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the petitioner, seeking regular bail in case FIR No.179, dated 22.10.2020, under Sections 408, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the IPC, 1860 and Section 66-D of the Information Technology Act, 2008, registered at Police Station Cyber Crime, Gurugram.

2. The petitioner has remained in detention for almost five months, since 24.10.2020. After completion of investigation, Challan against him has already been submitted.

3. The petitioner's bail prayer is opposed on behalf of the State as well as the complainant by contending that the amount of money defrauded/wrongfully gained by the petitioner's Company is huge to the tune of about R15,40,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Crores and Forty Lacs Only). As such, the petitioner is not entitled to be released on bail at this stage.

4. From his side, Ld. Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Ld. Apex Court passed in Criminal Appeal No.2178 of 2011 titled as "Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI", decided on 23.11.2011, in which it was observed, inter alia:

"14. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive or preventive. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it can be required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some un-convicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, 'necessity' is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of a refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any Court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an un-convicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson."

5. The accused person in the said case was thereafter permitted to be released on bail by the Ld. Apex Court after further observing that:

"26. When the undertrial prisoners are detained in jail custody to an indefinite period, Article 21 of the Constitution is violated. Every person, detained or arrested, is entitled to speedy trial, the question is : whether the same is possible in the present case. There are seventeen accused persons. Statement of the witnesses runs to several hundred pages and the documents on which reliance is placed by the prosecution, is voluminous. The trial may take considerable time and it looks to us that the Appellants, who are in jail, have to remain in jail longer than the period of detention, had they been convicted. It is not in the interest of justice that accused should be in jail for an indefinite period. No doubt, the offence alleged against the Appellants is a serious one in terms of alleged huge loss to the State exchequer, that, by itself, should not deter us from enlarging the Appellants on bail when there is no serious contention of the