The principle of Constructive res-judicata is applicable to writ petitions, and the Appellate Authority's compliance with regulations is crucial in disciplinary proceedings.

JUDGMENT

Anil Kshetarpal, J. - This is second round of writ petition. In the previous round, the petitioner filed CWP-9988-2017, challenging the order dated 09.12.2015, dismissing him from the service, which was affirmed in the appeal on 29.10.2016. The order dated 08.11.2016, forfeiting the gratuity earned, by the petitioner, was also the subject matter of challenge. The High Court after examining the facts of the case partly allowed the writ petition and remitted the matter back, to the Appellate Authority, for reconsideration on the issue of discrimination on account of penalty imposed vis-a-vis Mr. Mohit Mahajan. The operative part of the order reads as under:-

"Thus, in view of the above, the order dated 08.11.2016 (Annexure P-14) also suffers from a legal infirmity. Accordingly, the present writ petition is partly allowed, to the extent that the order dated 08.11.2016 (Annexure P-14) is quashed and the matter is remanded to the Appellate Authority, for reconsideration on the issue of discrimination qua Mr. Mohit Mahajan, as noticed above. Resultantly, the order dated 09.12.2015 (Annexure P-10) in pursuance of which, gratuity of the petitioner has also been forfeited, is also set aside."

In compliance with the aforesaid order, the Appellate Authority constituted under Regulation 17 of the Bank of Baroda Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation 1976 (hereinafter to be referred as "the Regulations of 1976"), reconsidered and again, penalized the petitioner with "dismissal which shall ordinarily be disqualification for future employment".

In the considered view of this court, the question which arises for adjudication is -

"If in the first round before the High Court in a writ petition, the petitioner does address arguments on an issue, which might or ought to have litigated, and an order of limited remand is passed in the first round, whether it would be permissible for him to take up the issue already abandoned, subsequently, in the 2nd round or whether such plea would be barred on the basis of the doctrine of constructive res-judicata?"

Certain facts are required to be noticed. The disciplinary proceedings, for major penalty, were initiated against the petitioner, for having committed serious lapses/irregularities while advancing various loans/advances when he was posted as a Senior Branch Manager at Phagwara Branch, from 18.06.2011 to 27.06.2012. It was alleged that due to serious lapses and irregularities, loans worth Rs. 10,561.75 lacs, were sanctioned and disbursed without proper documents and security resulting in compromising the position of the Bank, to recover the amount. The inquiring authority vide its report dated 08.08.2015, found him guilty of all the seven charges. Consequently, the disciplinary authority ordered penalty as noted above. It was further ordered that his suspension period shall be treated as period not spent on duty. An appeal, against the order of disciplinary authority, was dismissed, resulting in filing of the previous writ petition.

This Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner at length and with his able assistance perused the paper book.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has made the following submissions :-

1) Appellate Authority has failed to consider the scope of Regulation 17 (4) of the Regulations of 1976.

2) Appellate Authority has failed to consider the proportionality of the quantum of punishment.

3) There is discrimination on the quantum of punishment between the petitioner and Mr. Mohit Mahajan.

Regulation 17 of the Regulations of 1976 reads as under:-

"Regulation 17

(1) An officer employee may prefer an appeal to the Appellate Authority within forty five days from the date of receipt of the order imposing upon him any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 or against the order of suspension referred to in regulation 12.

Provided that the Appellate authority may entertain the appeal after expiry of the said period, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficien