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Sikkim High Court
A. M. BHATTACHARJEE
Nauranglall Agarwala - Appellant
Versus
Basant Kumari Sud. - Respondent
Decided On : 09/04/1980
EVICTION SUIT - GROUNDS - BONA FIDE REQUIREMENT - INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 4 OF GANGTOK RENT CONTROL AND EVICTION ACT, 1956 - REQUIREMENT FOR DEPENDENTS - REQUIREMENT FOR HUSBAND - REQUIREMENT FOR BUSINESS - REQUIREMENT FOR STAFF - REQUIREMENT FOR CHILDREN - ONUS OF PROOF - EVIDENCE - SUFFICIENCY.
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff-landlord filed a suit for eviction of the defendants-tenants from the tenanted premises on the grounds of bona fide requirement for her occupation and for arrears of rent. The learned District Judge decreed the suit on the ground of bona fide requirement, but not on the ground of default in payment of rent. The tenants-defendants appealed against the decree.
Finding of the Court:
1. The onus of proving the conditions, on proof of which alone the tenant may be evicted, lies on the landlord. 2. The expression 'landlord or his dependents', as used in Section 4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, would not only mean or relate to the landlord himself but would include his family and dependents and such person or persons as may be essential and necessary for the purpose of such occupation by the landlord. 3. If the enactment in question, providing for ejectment of tenants on the ground of requirement of the landlord uses the expression 'occupation of the landlord', or 'his own occupation', or other similar expressions referring to the landlord only, then it may be necessary, proper and also permissible to construe such expressions as not applying strictly or exclusively only to the landlord himself but as including his family or dependents or other normal emanations. But if the enactment in question, providing for ejectment of tenants on the ground of bona fide or reasonable requirement, expressly provides that not only the requirement of the 'landlord', but the requirement of some other class of persons also would be a ground of ejectment and such class of persons are also otherwise 'normal emanations of the landlord' or are members of his family, then the requirement, other than the personal requirement of the landlord, in order to justify ejectment under such enactment, must be the requirement of such persons only who can answer the descriptions of that particularly specified class and not of any other persons, even if such person can otherwise be regarded to be 'normal emanation' or member of the family of the landlord. 4. The requirement for the business of the plaintiff's husband is, in law and also otherwise, the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord herself. 5. The expression 'dependent' in the relevant context of Section 4 of the Gangtok Act, 1956 should mean and shall mean a person who is economically dependent. 6. The plaintiff has failed to prove that the premises are or can be required bona fide for the business of her husband, assuming that the requirement of the husband of the landlord is in law the requirement of the landlord herself, or is a requirement of her dependent. 7. The plaintiff has failed to prove that for her business, existing or new, she bona fide requires the portion of the house in the occupation of the defendants.
Issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff has discharged the onus and has been able to prove that 'the premises are required for the bona fide occupation of the landlord or his dependents', within the meaning of S.4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956? 2. Whether the requirement for the business of the plaintiff's husband is, in law and also otherwise, the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord herself? 3. Whether the expression 'dependent' in the relevant context of Section 4 of the Gangtok Act, 1956 should mean and shall mean a person who is economically dependent? 4. Whether the plaintiff has been able to prove that the premises are or can be required bona fide for the business of her husband, assuming that the requirement of the husband of the landlord is in law the requirement of the landlord herself, or is a requirement of her dependent? 5. Whether the plaintiff has been able to prove that for her business, existing or new, she bona fide requires the portion of the house in the occupation of the defendants?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The onus of proving the conditions, on proof of which alone the tenant may be evicted, lies on the landlord. 2. The expression 'landlord or his dependents', as used in Section 4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, would not only mean or relate to the landlord himself but would include his family and dependents and such person or persons as may be essential and necessary for the purpose of such occupation by the landlord. 3. If the enactment in question, providing for ejectment of tenants on the ground of requirement of the landlord uses the expression 'occupation of the landlord', or 'his own occupation', or other similar expressions referring to the landlord only, then it may be necessary, proper and also permissible to construe such expressions as not applying strictly or exclusively only to the landlord himself but as including his family or dependents or other normal emanations. But if the enactment in question, providing for ejectment of tenants on the ground of bona fide or reasonable requirement, expressly provides that not only the requirement of the 'landlord', but the requirement of some other class of persons also would be a ground of ejectment and such class of persons are also otherwise 'normal emanations of the landlord' or are members of his family, then the requirement, other than the personal requirement of the landlord, in order to justify ejectment under such enactment, must be the requirement of such persons only who can answer the descriptions of that particularly specified class and not of any other persons, even if such person can otherwise be regarded to be 'normal emanation' or member of the family of the landlord. 4. The requirement for the business of the plaintiff's husband is, in law and also otherwise, the requirement of the plaintiff-landlord herself. 5. The expression 'dependent' in the relevant context of Section 4 of the Gangtok Act, 1956 should mean and shall mean a person who is economically dependent. 6. The plaintiff has failed to prove that the premises are or can be required bona fide for the business of her husband, assuming that the requirement of the husband of the landlord is in law the requirement of the landlord herself, or is a requirement of her dependent. 7. The plaintiff has failed to prove that for her business, existing or new, she bona fide requires the portion of the house in the occupation of the defendants.
Final Decision: The decree granted by the learned District Judge for eviction from and recovery of khas possession of the suit-premises cannot be sustained and must, therefore, be set aside. The decree, so far it relates to the recovery of arrears of rent is, however, maintained with proportionate costs, being the amount of the Court-fees payable thereon and save as aforesaid the decree for the remaining amount of costs is also set aside. The appeal is, therefore, allowed accordingly, but with no order as to costs in this appeal.
JUDGEMENT :- This is an appeal by the tenants-defendants against the judgment of the learned District Judge of Sikkim decreeing the suit filed against them by their landlord for their eviction and for recovery of khas possession of the premises tenanted to them and also for arrears of rent. Eviction has been claimed by the landlord on the ground of her requirement of the premises for her bona fide occupation as well as on the ground of default in payment of rent by the tenants, being the two of the three grounds on which "the landlord may evict the tenant" under the provisions of S.4 of the Gangtok Rent control and Eviction Act, 1956.
2. The learned District Judge has, however, decreed ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement only and not on the ground of default, as he has found that though there were arrears of rent due justifying granting a decree for such arrears, the same was not legally sufficient to constitute a ground of ejectment under the provisions of Section 4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, in view of the decision of this court in Shakuntala Bai v. K.N. Dewan (1980-1 Ren CJ 577 : 1977 Sikkim LJ 33). The plaintiff-respondent, having thus obtained a decree of ejectment in her favour, could have, under the provisions of O.41. R.22, Civil P.C. sought to support the decree, without preferring any cross-objection, also on the ground of the alleged default, though the said ground has been decided against her in the Court below. But Mr. N.K. Maitra, learned Advocate appearing for the landlord-respondent, has not tried to support the decree on the ground of requisite default in payment of rent and, therefore, this aspect, namely, whether the learned District Judge ought to have decreed ejectment on the ground of default also, need not be considered in this appeal. The tenants-appellants also have not challenged the decree so far it relates to the recovery of arrears of rent. Accordingly, the question relating to rents and the defaults or arrears made in payment thereof would require no consideration in this appeal, which, is, tberefore, confined to the only question as to, whether the plaintiff has been able to prove that the premises in question are required "for the bona fide occupation of the landlord or his dependents", justifying the decree of ejectment granted by the learned District Judge. Mr. S.R. Sarkar and then Mr. N.B. Kharga, learned Advocates appearing for the tenants-appellants have urged that the learned District Judge went entirely wrong in granting the decree for ejectment, while Mr. Maitra appearing for the landlord-respondent has contended that the learned District Judge was absolutely right.
3. The relevant provision of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, contained in Section 4 thereof and providing for the grounds for ejectment of tenants of premises have been considered by this court in details in Paul Sangay v. Mahabir Prasad Agarwala, 1980-1 Ren CJ 540 :1978-2 Sikkim LJ 21: (AIR 1980 Sikkim 13) and that being a Division Bench decision of this Court, the observations made therein are binding on me. It has been pointed out in Paul Sangay's case (supra) that the Act ex facie deals with the difficult problem of scarcity of accommodation and as the provisions thereof clearly demonstrate, is more protective of the interest of the tenants than of the landlords. The Act professes to control premises-tenancies and the rents therefor and the eviction of the tenants therefrom and to restrict and to put an embargo on the power of the landlords to evict tenants at their pleasure. Construing the analogous provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961, the Supreme Court has observed in D.N. Shanghavi v. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das (AIR 1974 SC 1026 at 1028) that "the direct and immediate object of the Act is to ensure occupation of accommodation by them who are in need of it" and that "broadly speaking, a construction which fulfils this purpose should be
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