The expression "landlord" in Section 4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, does not include sons of the landlord.

BHATTACHARJEE, J.:- This is an application for the grant of a certificate under Art.133(1) of the Constitution of India for appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of this Court in C.A. No. 14 of 1976, dated 7th December, 1977.*

*Reported in AIR 1980 Sikkim 13.

2. Under Art.133(1) of the Constitution, as amended by the Constitution (Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972, a certificate granted by the High Court, in order to amount to a valid passport for the entry of an appeal to the Supreme Court, must certify that the case not only involved a question of law but that the said question is a substantial one and is also of general importance and that in the opinion of the High Court, the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in the State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money (AIR 1976 SC 1111) that (at p. 1112):-

"A substantial question of law of general importance is a sine qua non to certify fitness for hearing by the apex Court. Nay, more; the question, however, important and substantial, must be of such pervasive import and deep significance that in the High Court's judgment it imperatively needs to be settled at the national level by the highest bench."

3. In that case the Supreme Court has further observed that "the grant of a constitutional passport to the Supreme Court by the High Court is not a matter of easy insouciance but anxious advertence to the dual vital requirements built into Art.133(1) by specific amendment "and that failure thereof" stultifies the scheme of the Article and floods" the Supreme Court "with cases of lesser magnitude with illegitimate entry." Judged by these standards let me, therefore, consider whether we can grant a certificate as prayed for in this case.

4. The suit giving rise to this Civil First Appeal No. 14 of 1975 was filed by the plaintiff-respondent against his tenant the defendant-appellant for eviction of the tenant on the ground of defaults made by the defendant in payment of rent and also on the ground that the occupation of the premises was reasonably and bona fide required as the two sons of the plaintiff "wanted to start their own independent business" and that some additional structure was to be made in the building which could not be made unless the defendant vacated.

5. The learned District Judge, who tried the suit, held that the defendant defaulted in payment of rent, but as the period of default was for three months only, a decree for ejectment could not be passed on the ground of such default under the provisions of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, which require rent in arrears to "amount to four months rent or more" to justify ejectment. We have accepted and agreed with this finding of the learned District Judge in Appeal.

6. The learned District Judge further held that requirement for making additional structures has been expressly excluded from the grounds of ejectment under the provisions of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, whereunder the required constructional works must amount to "thorough overhauling" in order to justify ejectment and accordingly the learned District Judge held the plaintiff not to be entitled to the decree of ejectment on the ground of requirement for making additional structures. We have, in this appeal, agreed with and accepted this finding of the learned District Judge.

7. The learned District Judge, however, held that the plaintiff required the "premises in dispute for bona fide necessity of his dependents", being his two sons. We have held that since the provisions of Section 4 of the Gangtok Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1956, enable a landlord to eject his tenant only when the premises are required for the bona fide occupation of "the landlord or his dependents" requirement for the occupation of any person other than the landlord, to furnish a ground for ejectment, must be requirement of a person who is dependent on the landlord. We have held that if the