The main legal point established is that the extension of laws to a new area, without repealing existing corresponding laws, may result in the implied repeal of the existing laws and can be valid under the Constitution.

1. The accused-appellant has been convicted on his own plea of guilty to a charge under S. 25 (1) of the Arms Act, 1959, which has been extended to Sikkim by the President by a notification under the provisions of Cl. (n) of Art.371F of the Constitution of India on 16th May, 1975, and enforced on 1st Aug., 1976. The charge was that the accused on or about 19th Feb.. 1978, had in his possession a revolver and one live cartridge without any licence therefor and the accused has been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year.

2. If the Arms Act, 1959, is validly operative in Sikkim as a result of its extension to and enforcement in Sikkim under the provisions of Art. 371F (n) of the Constitution, then the conviction must be maintained and the appeal must be dismissed as there is and can be no other challenge to the conviction in this case.

3. Under S. 412 of Cr. P. C., 1898, which is still now the law relating to Criminal Procedure in Sikkim, if an accused person has pleaded guilty and has been convicted on such plea, there shall be no appeal except as to the extent or legality of the sentence except where the conviction is made by a Magistrate of the Second or the Third Class. But there is no doubt that even though the facts admitted amount to an offence under the provisions of a law, but the law itself is not in force or operation, the so called admission cannot amount to an admission of the commission of an offence or a plea of guilty. The expression "offence" means, as will appear from S. 3 (38) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, an act or omission made punishable by any law in force; but if the relevant law is not at all in force, then the facts admitted, even if they amount to an offence under the provisions of the said law, would not amount to an admission of the commission of an offence or a plea of guilty in any area where the law is not in force. Therefore, if the Arms Act, 1959, is not validly operative in Sikkim, the admission of guilt in this case shall not amount to any admission or a plea of guilt within the meaning of S. 412 of the Cr. P. C. 1898, to bar an appeal challenging the legality of the conviction.

I cannot accept the contention that even in such a case the appeal against the legality of the conviction is barred and not maintainable under S. 412, Cr. P. C. and that the accused is to seek his remedy in a revisional or a writ proceeding or a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution. If the law whereunder the accused has been convicted is itself not in force or operation then the conviction will amount to a violation of Art. 20 of the Constitution whereunder "no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force" and I believe that even a Court sitting in appeal from a conviction on, a plea of guilty cannot remain a silent spectator to such an infraction of the Constitution. If the Arms Act, 1959, is not in force, then the appeal in my view is maintainable even against the legality of the conviction and I need not invoke any other jurisdiction vested in this Court in disposing of this case.

4. The next question, therefore, on which the appeal entirely depends is whether the Arms Act, 1959, is validly operative in Sikkim after its extension thereto by the President by a notification under Cl. (n) of Art. 371-F of the Constitution? The question has arisen because the corresponding Sikkim Law, being the Sikkim Arms Rules, 1962, has not been repealed whether before or simultaneously with or even after the Arms Act, 1959, has been extended to and enforced in Sikkim and on the first day of hearing 1 requested the learned Advocate-General to satisfy me as to whether the validity of the extension of the Arms Act, 1959, would be affected because of the non-repealment of the Sikkim Arms Rules, 1962. The Advocate-General contended that the extension and enforcement of Arms Act, 1959 under the provisions of Art. 371F (n) of the Constitution would be quite valid in spi