The main legal point established in the judgment is that 'sufficient cause' for delay must be adequately explained, and negligence or inaction cannot be imputed to the party seeking Condonation of Delay.

ORDER :

Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.

1. By filing this Application under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Appellant seeks Condonation of 64 days delay in filing the Appeal.

2. The grounds put forth for the delay are that, pursuant to the Judgment pronounced by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, East Sikkim at Gangtok, in MACT Case No. 38 of 2016 on 28.11.2017, copy thereof was made over to the Appellant on 29.12.2017. After receiving a certified copy of the Judgment and Award from the concerned Advocate at Gangtok Court, the Branch Manager of the Appellant at Gangtok examined the Judgment. On verification of the policy papers, he forwarded the matter to the Senior Divisional Manager at Siliguri Divisional Office. Pursuant thereto, the matter “... was forwarded to Branch Manager, Gangtok Branch (sic).” The Divisional Office at Siliguri then sought the opinion of the Counsel at Siliguri who advised that the matter was a fit case for preferring Appeal. Mr. Sudhir Prasad, Advocate, was then appointed as Counsel for the Appellant vide letter dated 19.02.2018, to prefer an Appeal before this Court. The appointment letter was received by Mr. Prasad on 22.02.2018. While drafting the Memo of Appeal, certain clarifications were sought from the Appellant Company including additional documents related to the matter. Added to the above grounds was the inexperience of the Counsel in motor accidents appeal matters, thus the Appeal came to be filed on 02.05.2018. That, the above grounds prevented the Appellant from preferring the Appeal within the statutory period of 90 days and is sufficient cause. That, the Appellant Company has a strong prima facie case on merits and should the delay not be condoned, prejudice will be caused to them, hence the prayer for Condonation of delay.

3. Learned Counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, vehemently objected to the Petition for Condonation of delay, inter alia, on grounds that in the first instance, the certified copy of the Judgment, as records would reveal, was ready on 15.12.2017, the Judgment having been pronounced on 28.11.2017. The Appellant Company failed to collect the Judgment from the relevant Section of the Court on 15.12.2017 and cannot lay the blame at the door of the Tribunal. The Claim Petition before the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 where compensation of Rs.5,43,650/- (Rupees Five Lakhs, Fourty Three Thousand, Six Hundred and Fifty) only, was granted based on the salary of the victim placed at Rs.3,325/- (Rupees Three Thousand, Three Hundred and Twenty Five) only, per month. There is no error in the Multiplier of 17 adopted by the learned Tribunal as per the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as the age of the deceased was about 33 years. Besides, the Appeal is filed on a wrong interpretation of the insurance cover as it is clear that the Petition is one under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and as per the conditions of the Insurance Policy, Driver’s Clause has been included. The deceased was self-employed and the owner of the vehicle in accident which he was driving and as owner he was not barred from driving the vehicle and hence an extra coverage to the tune of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) only, had been obtained under the Personal Accident Claim benefit. It was mandatory that the Claimants be granted Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) only, under the said claim benefit. Further, the policy issued was a package policy and not limited to Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) only, as it is also covered by IMT No.15/extra premium of Rs.100/- (Rupees One Hundred) only. Hence, the petition for Condonation of delay is a ruse to prevent the Claimants from obtaining their rightful reliefs under the benevolent legislation and deserves dismissal as also the Appeal.

4. I have considered the submissions of learned Counsel