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2004 Supreme(All) 1097

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
S. N. SRIVASTAVA
SHIV NARAIN SINGH (DECEASED BY LRS) - Appellant
Versus
BOARD OF REVENUE, U. P. - Respondents
C. M. W. P. 43189 Of 1993
Decided On : 07/05/2004

Advocates Appeared:
A.K.SRIVASTAVA, A.P.SRIVASTAVA, M.N.SINGH, Shyarn Lal, V.K.SINGH, WAJAHAT HUSAIN KHAN

The main legal point established in the judgment is the liberal construction of the 'sufficient cause' provision under the Limitation Act and the emphasis on advancing substantial justice.

Headnote:

ABATEMENT - U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act - Section 229 B/176 - 5, 12 of the Limitation Act - The court discussed the abatement of the second appeal due to the failure to file a substitution application within the statutory period. The court referred to the Limitation Act and emphasized the liberal construction of the 'sufficient cause' provision. The court highlighted the need to advance substantial justice and the importance of acceptable explanations for delay.

Fact of the Case:

The dismissal of the second appeal for not filing a substitution application within the statutory period led to the filing of the present petition. The suit sought relief under Section 229 B/176 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act, and the decision rendered by the Asstt. Collector was appealed, leading to subsequent deaths of respondents and the abatement of the appeal.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the Board of Revenue's order lacked legitimacy on pivotal aspects and did not delve deeper into the substantiality of causes. The court quashed the impugned order and directed the Board of Revenue to hear the appeal on merit and decide within two months.

Issues: The issues revolved around the abatement of the second appeal due to the failure to file a substitution application within the statutory period, the ignorance of the deaths of respondents, and the delay in filing the substitution application.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the liberal construction of the 'sufficient cause' provision under the Limitation Act and the need to advance substantial justice. It found that the Board of Revenue's order lacked legitimacy and did not delve into the substantiality of causes, leading to the quashing of the impugned order.

Final Decision: The petition succeeded, and the impugned order was quashed. The matter was relegated to the Board of Revenue for decision afresh, with a directive to hear the appeal on merit and decide within two months.

( 1 ) DISMISSAL of second Appeal as having abated for not filing substitution application seeking substitution of respondents 7 and 1 In the array of parties within the statutory period, has been the causative factor leading to filing of the present petition challenging the judgment dated 2-11-1993 passed by Board of Revenue.

( 2 ) IN the suit instituted by respondents 4 and 5 under Section 229 B/176 of the u. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act relief sought was for declaring themselves to be co-bhumidhars with defendant No. 1 of Schedule A and co-sirdars of Schedule B and further claiming that their 2/5th share be separated. The decision rendered by Asstt. Collector, 1st class Varanasi held Bhonu, father of the petitioner to be sole sirdar of plot No. 31/1 and Lurkhur to be the sole Sirdar of plot no. 28/2 and for the rest of the land suit was decreed. The appeal preferred against the said decision ended up in dismissal and consequently, a second appeal was filed by bhonu, father of the petitioner before Board of Revenue. During the pendency of appeal, one Sonu Ram respondent No. 1 in the second appeal died on 5-7-1989. Bhonu also died during the pendency of appeal on 3-10-1991 and substitution application was moved by the petitioner on 27-11-1991. It is claimed in the writ petition that Triloki arrayed. as respondent No. 7 had died during pendency of appeal but no substitution application was moved. Subsequently lurkhur respondent No. 4 in the appeal sought abatement of appeal by means of application dated 30-11-1992 on the ground of want of steps in the matter of substitution pursuant to the death of Triloki as a consequence of which, Board of Revenue passed the impugned order in the second appeal thereby abating the second appeal.

( 3 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record and the impugned order.

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner canvassed that neither Bhonu nor the petitioner gained knowledge of the death of Triloki and further copy of the application made by Lurkhur before the Board of revenue on 30-11-1992 was never served either to the petitioner or his counsel and the petitioner became aware of the death on 2-11-1993 on which date the impugned order was passed. It was further canvassed by the learned counsel that Triloki who was arrayed as respondent No. 7 was only a pro forma party and his substitution in the array of parties was dispensable further submitting that he never filed written statement nor did he contest the case. It was further submitted that the substitution application was attended with an affidavit which remained uncontroverted and cause shown was sufficient but the Board of Revenue overlooked the causes shown and proceeded to pass the impugned order which it is further submitted, is liable to be quashed. Per contra, Sri A. P. Srivastava, appearing for the respondent tried to justify impugned order arguing that there was unconscionable delay which was not satisfactorily explained and the application for condonation of delay was rightly rejected and second appeal was rightly dismissed as having abated.

( 5 ) BEFORE proceeding further, I would first scan the impugned order passed by the board of Revenue. The line of reasoning adopted in the impugned order is that no substitution application was filed to bring on record the heirs of the deceased respondent no. 7 Triloki who had died on 17-5-1986 and again respondent No. 1 Sonhu had died on 5-7-1989 while substitution application was preferred on 19-12-1989 in which the causative factor of delay was the own inadvertence of the appellant. It bears no repudiation that the Rules of Limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties but are intended that the other parties do not resort to temporizing tactics and hence the remedy may be hedged in with some time limit within which a suitor had to seek his legal remedy. In Shakuntala Devi jain v. Kuntal Kumari AIR 1969 SC 575 and state of W. B. v. Administr








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