2004 Supreme(All) 1193
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
S. N. SRIVASTAVA
MAKSOOD - Appellant
Versus
UPPER DISTRICT JUDGE IIIRD, AZAMGARH - Respondents
Civil M. W. P. 1500 Of 2003
Decided On : 07/21/2004
J.S.YADAV, R.N.YADAV
The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of interpreting the expression 'sufficient cause' in a manner that promotes substantial justice over technical considerations when applying Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963.
Headnote:
Delay Condonation - Restoration of Misc. Appeal - Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 - The court discussed the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 and emphasized the need for a liberal approach in condoning delay to ensure substantial justice. The court referred to the principles established in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (AIR 1987 SC 1353) and highlighted the importance of interpreting the expression 'sufficient cause' in a manner that promotes substantial justice over technical considerations.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners' appeal was dismissed for default due to a one-day delay in filing the restoration application. The court rejected the restoration application and delay condonation application as time-barred.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the lower appellate Court had not appreciated the grounds for the one-day delay in the correct perspective and erroneously rejected the applications on hypertechnical considerations.
Issues: The main issue was whether the 'sufficient cause' test had been properly applied in considering the grounds for the delay in filing the applications.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the need for a liberal approach in interpreting the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 to ensure substantial justice and to avoid scuttling a decision on merits due to technicalities.
Final Decision: The petition was allowed, and the impugned order was quashed. The restoration application and delay condonation application were allowed, and the Misc. Appeal was restored to its number with directions to decide the appeal on merits within a specified period.
( 1 ) IMPUGNED herein is the order dated 18-12-2002 passed by Addl. District Judge, Azamgarh whereby two applications one paper No. 6 C2 moved for condonation of delay and another paper No. 4c 2 praying for restoration of Misc. Appeal bearing No. 100 of 2000 to its number which had been dismissed for default on 15-1-2002, came to be rejected.
( 2 ) ACCORDING to the facts forthcoming on record, the Misc. Appeal aforestated had been set down for 4-12-2001 on which date, application for grant of time was made. Thereafter, the petitioners were intimated by their counsel that next date fixed in the case was 15-2-2002 while the date fixed in the case was 15-1-2002 on which date the appeal had already been dismissed for want of prosecution. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners that when the petitioners turned up on 15-2-2002, it was cognized to them that the appeal had been dismissed for want of prosecution on 15-1-2002 and therefore, the same day the petitioners moved the two applications aforestated one for condonation of delay and another for restoration of Misc. Appeal to its number. The two applications aforestated lingered for decision before the Court and on 18-12-2002, the Court below dismissed the two applications as being time barred.
( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners propounded that application for restoration was dismissed as barred by time notwithstanding the fact that delay of one day was too insignificant to matter considering that cogent and convincing grounds showing sufficient cause in two applications which were attended with affidavits had been set out. It was further canvassed that the substantive ground urged explaining one days delay was that the petitioners went by information furnished by their counsel that the appeal had been fixed for 15-2-2002 and therefore, they could not turn up on the date fixed and instead, turned up in the case on 15-2-2002. Per contra, learned counsel for the Opp. Parties propped up the order stating that the applications were rightly rejected as time barred as the delay was deliberate and leniency if any in the matter would be misplaced and in antagonism of the spirit of the law of limitation.
( 4 ) THE question that emerges for consideration in the instant case is whether "sufficient cause" test has been properly applied considering the grounds set out in the affidavits accompanying the two applications. In connection with the propositions aforestated, I would first acquaint myself with the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963, which is abstracted below. "any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. "the standard test in such matter is "sufficient cause" and it can be inferred from the aforestated section that the intendment underlying the Act is to enable the Courts to do even-handed and substantial justice and the matter may be disposed of on merits in preference to approach, which scuttles a decision on merits. In the case in hand, it has been clearly averred in the affidavits that the petitioners were erroneously Intimated about the date fixed in the case and instead of appearing on 15-1-2002, the petitioners turned up on 15-2-2002 and the same day, on being made aware of dismissal on appeal on 15-1-2002, they moved the application for restoration which was barred by only one days delay. From a perusal of the impugned order, it is revealed that the Court below wandered into technicalities inasmuch as it was swayed by the insubstantial arguments that the affidavit initially bore the name of Maqsood which had cutting and name of Mahfooz alias Hitler was overwritten which was not authenticated by the Oath Co