2004 Supreme(All) 1926
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
M. KATJU, SUNIL AMBWANI, IMTIYAZ MURTAZA, K. K. MISRA, RAVINDRA SINGH
RAM LAL - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF U. P. - Respondents
Habeas Corpus Writ Petn. 39612 Of 1999
Decided On : 10/15/2004
ARVIND TRIPATHI, D.S.MISHRA, J.G.Upadhyay, Mohammad Isa Khan, R.C.Kandpal, R.P.S.KASHYAP
Preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention and can be made with or without prosecution, in anticipation, after discharge, and even after acquittal.
Headnote:
Detention Order - National Security Act - Section 3 - [147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 504, 506, 34, IPC, Section 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act, Section 25(4) of Arms Act, 1959] - The court discussed the validity of detention orders under the National Security Act, 1980 based on identical grounds related to a specific incident. The court analyzed the impact of acquittal in a criminal case on the legality of continued detention and overruled the previous decision in Ram Prasad Chaudhary v. State of U. P.
Fact of the Case:
The validity of detention orders based on identical grounds related to a specific incident was challenged. The incident involved a brutal murder and serious injuries, leading to the registration of criminal cases.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the order of acquittal in a criminal prosecution does not act as a bar to preventive action based on the same incident. It further ruled that continued detention does not become illegal if there is acquittal during the detention under preventive detention law. The court overruled the previous decision in Ram Prasad Chaudhary v. State of U. P.
Issues: Validity of detention orders based on identical grounds, impact of acquittal in a criminal case on continued detention
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized that preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention and can be made with or without prosecution, in anticipation, after discharge, and even after acquittal. The court also highlighted that acquittal in a criminal case does not necessarily mean that the offence was not committed.
Final Decision: The decision of the Full Bench in Ram Prasad Chaudhary v. State of U. P. was overruled, and the petition was dismissed as the detenues were directed to be released.
( 1 ) IN all the writ petitions validity of detention order dated 26-6-99 on identical grounds under sub-section (2) read with sub-section (3) of Section 3 of national Security Act, 1980 (briefly, the Act)with a view to preventing the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order was challenged.
( 2 ) THE grounds of detention relate to an incident which had taken place on 9-6-99 in broad day light at 11. 30 in which upendra, son of Mam Chandra was brutally murdered and Smt. Shanti, wife of Mam chandra and Anand, brother-in-law of Mam chandra were seriously injured. Case Crime no. 308 of 1999 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 504, 506, 34, IPC and Section 7, Criminal Law Amendment Act and case Crime No. 310 of 1999 under Section 25 (4) of Arms Act, 1959 were registered at p. S. Loni, district Ghaziabad. The detenu ram Lal and Man Singh were arrested on the spot along with their respective weapons. The detention orders under challenge in each of these writ petitions were grounded on the same incident and the questions of law and facts are also common.
( 3 ) WE have heard Sri R. C. Kandpal and sri D. S. Misra for the petitioners and Sri arvind Tripathi, learned A. G. A. from the side of the State.
( 4 ) A Bench consisting of Honble S. R. Singh and Honble V. K. Chaturvedi, JJ. heard the said matter at length and formulated three questions of law as they disagreed with the Full Bench decision in the case of Ram Prasad Chaudhary v. State of u. P. , 1986 All Cri C 186 : (1986 All LJ 916), in which the Court was of the opinion that the detention order became illegal in view of the acquittal recorded by the trial Court in the criminal case. Three questions formulated by the Bench are as follows :1. Whether an order of acquittal recorded in a criminal prosecution in respect of the detention related incident, would constitute a bar to an order of preventive detention being made grounded on the same incident? 2. Whether a judgment and order of acquittal recorded during the currency of detention in a regular trial and criminal prosecution in relation to which incident the order of preventive detention ground was passed would ipso facto render the continued detention illegal? 3. Whether this Court should refrain from entering into the question as to the effect of the order of acquittal recorded during the currency of the detention and leave it to be decided by the executive in exercise of its power under Section 14 of the Act?
( 5 ) THE argument on behalf of the petitioners is that since the petitioners have been acquitted by the learned Sessions judge, it would be deemed that no such incident took place and hence due to the acquittal, the continued detention becomes illegal. The further argument is that if there is acquittal on merit, no order of detention can be passed subsequently and if the acquittal is during detention, the continued detention would be illegal. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision in the case of Ramesh Yadav v. District. Magistrate, etah, (1985) 4 SCC 232 : (AIR 1986 sc 315 : 1986 Cri LJ 312 ). The detention order in the above noted case was set aside on the ground that there was apprehension of grant of bail to the accused and on the basis of some stale grounds and grounds in respect of which the detenue had already been acquitted. In para 5 of its judgment, the Division Bench had held "admittedly, a trial had taken place and there has been acquittal. That ground, therefore, was not available to be used". A Full Bench of lucknow Bench of this Court consisting of honble K. S. Varma, Honble S. C. Mathur and Honble G. B. Singh, JJ. had held that if once the detenue is acquitted by a criminal Court on the ground on which the detention order was passed, he cannot be detained on that ground. The Full Bench in para 24 of its judgment went to the extent to hold that as the prosecution witness did not support the case put forward by it, the prosecu