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2003 Supreme(All) 1901

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
S. N. Srivastava, J.
URMILA DEVI - Appellant
Versus
U. P. POWER CORPORATION - Respondents
C. M. W. P. 20938 Of 2002
Decided On : 09/09/2003

Advocates Appeared:
A.LAL, ASHOK PANDEY, Nripendra Mishra

The main legal point established in the judgment is the need to interpret the word 'family' in the compassionate appointment rules liberally, considering the inclusive definition and the object sought to be served by the rules.

Headnote:

Compassionate Appointment - Interpretation of Family - U.P. State Electricity Board Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1975 - [Section 79(c) of the Electricity Act, 1948] - The court discussed the interpretation of the word 'family' as defined in the U.P. State Electricity Board Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1975, and emphasized the need to construe the word liberally in line with the inclusive definition and the object sought to be served by the rules. The court held that the petitioner, being the heir of the predeceased son and dependent for sustenance on the deceased employee, should be considered as one of the family members of the deceased and is entitled to compassionate appointment under the rules.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, daughter-in-law of the deceased employee, applied for compassionate appointment after her husband's death. Her application was declined on the grounds that she did not fall within the definition of family as per the U.P. State Electricity Board Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1975.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the petitioner, being the heir of the predeceased son and dependent for sustenance on the deceased employee, should be considered as one of the family members of the deceased and is entitled to compassionate appointment under the rules.

Issues: Interpretation of the word 'family' in the U.P. State Electricity Board Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1975, and whether the petitioner qualifies as a family member for compassionate appointment.

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the need to construe the word 'family' liberally in line with the inclusive definition and the object sought to be served by the rules, and held that the petitioner should be considered as one of the family members of the deceased for compassionate appointment.

Final Decision: The petition succeeded, and the order declining the petitioner's claim for compassionate appointment was quashed. The respondents were directed to issue appropriate orders for the petitioner's appointment under the rules within a specified period.

S. N. SRIVASTAVA, J.

( 1 ) PETITION has been filed by Smt. Urmila Devi daughter-in-law of deceased Kishun Lal, who died in-harness on 21. 4. 1999. The deceased Kishun Lal was employed and discharging his duties as Painter in the Electricity Transmission Division-11, U. P. Power Corporation, Allahabad at the time of his death. The necessary facts which bear on the controversy involved in the present petition are that Anil Kumar husband of the petitioner predeceased his father late Sri Kishun Lal and he was survived by the petitioner and two children, i. e. , one son and one daughter. In the wake of the death of Anil Kumar, his family consisting of wife and two children was sustaining on the earning of late Kishun Lal. Consequent upon the death of Kishun Lal, the petitioner who happened to be his daughter-in-law, applied for compassionate appointment which according to the petitioner was declined by means of order dated 22. 4. 2002 passed by the respondent No. 2 on the premises that she did not fall within the definition of family as envisaged in the provisions of u. P. State Electricity Board Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1975.

( 2 ) I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Nripendra Misra for the respondents.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed the correctness of the impeached order on the ground that the father-in-law of the petitioner had breathed his last during the lifetime of her husband and therefore, the petitioner fell back upon her father-in-law for sustenance and by this reckoning, the petitioner should be deemed to be the member of the family of the deceased government servant for the purposes of the aforesaid rules. The learned standing counsel, on the other hand, did not countenance the submission stating that the daughter-in-law is not included in the definition of the word family as defined in the relevant Dying-in-Harness Rules which is applicable to recruitment of dependents of the deceased Government servants. The relevant rule being germane to the controversy is abstracted below for ready reference :. . (VERNACULAR MATTER OMMITED ). .

( 4 ) IN view of the above submissions canvassed across the bar, the question that begs consideration is whether the petitioner could be taken to be the family member of the deceased in the fact-situation of the case. From a perusal of the aforestated rule, it transpires that the word "family" has been interpreted to signify and include wife or husband, son, unmarried daughter and widowed daughter. The word include has been interpreted in various decisions and the distillate of what has been observed in various decisions by the Apex Court is that the use of word "include", would enlarge the scope of the definition, (see Municipal Corporation of Greater bombay v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. , 1991 Supp (2) SCC 18 ). In another decision the word "include", it has been observed, is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute ; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include, (see Regional Director, E. S. I. Corporation v. High Land Coffee works, (1991) 3 SCC 617, 620 ). In C. I. T. v. Taj Mahal Hotel. (1971) 3 SCC 550, the Apex court expressed the view that the word "includes" is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. When it is so used, those words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The word "include" is also susceptible of other constructions. In south Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association v. State of G











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