The distinction between the nature of evidence and burden of proof in criminal and departmental inquiries, and the finality of the departmental decision despite subsequent acquittal in a criminal case.

( 1 ) THE crucial question for determination in the present writ petition is that whether a government servant who has been removed from service after departmental inquiry on the charges which have also given rise to a criminal case against the said employee is liable to be reinstated after a final order of acquittal has been passed in the criminal case. The controversy is the product of the following facts.

( 2 ) THE petitioner-Vikrama Singh was appointed as a constable in Railway Protection Force in the year 1975. After a number of transfers, he came to be posted at Varanasi. He was placed under suspension by order dated 2. 1. 1991 passed by the competent authority on account of the fact that he was involved in a Crime Case No. 20 of 1990 R. P. F. /dn. Post registered under Section 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). It gave rise to the trial of the petitioner as an accused with other accused persons in Criminal Case No. 810 of 1992. A departmental inquiry on the same allegations for which first information report was lodged, was also initiated. The order of suspension was challenged by the petitioner by filing civil Misc. Writ No. 8385 of 1991. The order of suspension was quashed with the observation that the disciplinary authority shall be at liberty to conduct the departmental inquiry after serving a charge-sheet. After reinstatement, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 11. 3. 1993. After the conclusion of the departmental inquiry, the petitioner was removed from service on 7. 7. 1994. The petitioner preferred a departmental appeal which was dismissed on 7. 3. 1995 by the appellate authority, i. e. , Additional Chief Security Commissioner. Eastern railway. Calcutta, a copy of which is Annexure-7 to the writ petition. The trial of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 810 of 1992 culminated in passing of an order of acquittal dated 2. 4. 1997 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Eastern railway, Mughalsarai. After acquittal, the petitioner moved an application for his reinstatement on 22. 1. 1998 (Annexure-8 to the writ petition ). It is stated that the departmental authorities informed the petitioner that the order of acquittal has been challenged by filing a criminal appeal against the order of acquittal before this Court. The question of reinstatement of the petitioner in service after acquittal was, therefore, deferred. By means of this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought the relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to reinstate him in service.

( 3 ) COUNTER and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged. Heard Sri V. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri B. B. Paul appearing on behalf of the respondents.

( 4 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that since the criminal and departmental proceedings against the petitioner were based on identical set of facts, namely, the theft of certain railway property and recovery thereof from his possession, the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service after his acquittal from the criminal charge. It was pointed out that even the Criminal appeal No. 2448 of 1998 preferred by the respondents against the order of acquittal has been dismissed by this Court on 1. 10. 1999. An application for recall of the said order was moved by the Union of India which too has been dismissed on 4. 2. 2000 and in this manner, the order of acquittal of the petitioner has become final. In support of his contention that after acquittal, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in service, reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another, (1999) 3 scc 679. Sri B. B. Paul, however, repelled the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner primarily on the ground that the scope and object of the de