An order of suspension pending inquiry can be passed by an authority superior to the appointing authority, and the court's jurisdiction is limited to examining the procedural correctness of the decision-making process.

( 1 ) THE short and moot point for determination and consideration in the present petition is whether a Government servant can be placed under suspension pending departmental inquiry or in contemplation thereof by an order passed by an officer higher in rank than the appointing authority? The controversy has arisen in the wake of the following facts.

( 2 ) THE petitioner, who is a Boring Technician in the Department of Minor Irrigation and is posted at Vikas Khand, Virnao, district Ghazipur, has been placed under suspension in contemplation of departmental inquiry by order dated 21. 9. 2000 by the Superintending Engineer, minor Irrigation Circle, Allahabad. There is no dispute about the fact that the services of the petitioner are governed by U. P. Laghu Sinchai Boring Providhigya Sewa Niyamawali, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the niyamawali) and in pursuance of Rule 3 (ka), the Executive engineer, (Adhishashi Abhiyanta) of concerned Mandal of the Minor Irrigation Department is the appointing authority.

( 3 ) IT is also an indubitable fact that the order of suspension dated 21. 9. 2000, a copy of which is annexure-1 to the petition, has been passed by Superintending Engineer, Minor Irrigation Circle, allahabad, who is an authority higher in rank to the Executive Engineer, i. e. , the appointing authority. The gravamen of the charges against the petitioner is that he has submitted false travelling Allowance bills for Rs. 9308. 90p. on the basis of forged and fictitious documents by misleading the authorities. He has further misconducted himself by capricious and indisciplined behaviour.

( 4 ) THE only ground canvassed to challenge the aforesaid order of suspension in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is that it is vitiated on account of the fact that it has not been passed by the Executive Engineer, competent to appoint the petitioner under the rules.

( 5 ) THE position is accepted at all hands that the Executive Engineer concerned is the appointing authority of the petitioner, while the Superintending Engineer who has suspended the petitioner is an officer higher in rank than the Executive Engineer.

( 6 ) HEARD S/sri M. M. Rai and Sudhakar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned standing counsel as well as Ms. Naheed Ara Moonis appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 4.

( 7 ) SRI Sudhakar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since the Executive engineer has been specified as the appointing authority under the rules governing the service conditions, no other officer is empowered to suspend the petitioner. He further urged that when specific provision with regard to the appointing authority has been made in the rules, no other authority can exercise the powers to initiate disciplinary proceedings or to suspend an employee. In short, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when a rule deals with a particular subject and is exhaustive on that subject, it has to be followed and no other course in violation thereof is permissible. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of S. P. Srivastaua v. Banaras Electric Light and Power Company Ltd. , 1968 ALJ 257, in which it was observed that it is a well known cannon of construction that when a particular mode of doing something is specified by statute, the modes of doing that thing are prohibited by necessary implication. A reference was also made to the decision of the Apex Court in Babaji Kondaji Garad and others v. Nasik Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. , AIR 1984 SC 192, in which the principles of interpretation of statutes and construction of legislative measures came to be considered. It was held that when statutes require certain things to be done in a particular manner, it can be done in that manner alone, unless a contrary indication is to be found in the statutes. There can be no q