The main legal point established is that appointments under the Dying in Harness Rules are permanent, and the termination of a permanent employee should adhere to principles of natural justice.

( 1 ) THE petitioner was appointed on March 31, 1991 as Chaukidar under the Dying in Harness rules by the Executive Engineer, Laghu Dal Nahar Division, Varanasi. On April 18, 1998 when the petitioner was going to office he met with an accident near Bus Stand, Varanasi in which he was seriously injured. He was hospitalised. He informed the Executive Engineer/respondent No. 3 on May 18, 1998 by letter sent under postal certificate that he was seriously injured, his Spinal cord was affected, and he suffered injury in his leg, therefore, medical leave be granted to him. He was under medical treatment in Government Ayurvedic Hospital from April 18, 1998 to June 8, 1998. On June 16, 1998 he sent a letter to respondent No. 3 informing respondent No. 3 that he could not get any relief from Ayurvedic medicines and he being referred by Ayurvedic hospital to Allopathic Hospital for treatment. Therefore, he requested that his absence be condoned. He remained under treatment in Allopathic Hospital from June 9, 1998 to January 15, 1999. He was again referred to Kamlapati Tripathi Hospital where he was under treatment from january 16, 1999 to January 25, 1999. He on February 20, 1999 made an application to respondent No. 3 that his absence be adjusted in his leave. Thereafter, he was again referred for treatment to State Allopathic Hospital, Varanasi and was under treatment from May 20, 1999 to may 30, 1999. He was declared fit on May 30, 1999 by Medical Officer-in-charge of State allopathic Hospital and fitness certificate was issued to him. The petitioner has filed medical certificates along with this petition in support of his injury and treatments taken in various hospitals at Varanasi. He has filed a copy of the fitness certificate, filed as Annexure 7 to the writ petition. On June 3, 1999 the petitioner went to join his duty. He was served with a termination order dated February 3, 1999 by the respondents. It is this order of termination dated February 3, 1999 which has been challenged by the petitioner in the instant writ petition.

( 2 ) I have heard Shri Sunil Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri R. P. Dubey, Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents.

( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has urged that the petitioner was appointed under Dying in harness Rules. He was a permanent employee and his service could not be terminated by the respondents without affording any opportunity to the petitioner. He urged that the petitioner met with an accident and he informed the Executive Engineer about his medical treatment and sent applications and medical certificates for grant of leave as he had suffered serious injury in his spinal Cord, therefore, the respondents ought to have sanctioned leave to the petitioner. The absence of petitioner, due to his accident and medical treatment, could not furnish a ground for termination of petitioners service. Letters served by respondents were not served on the petitioner nor he came to know about the notice published in newspapers as he was under medical treatment. On the other hand learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has urged that the petitioner was a temporary employee as per the terms of his appointment letter. He further urged that tbe respondents were not informed of the petitioners accident or his medical treatment. The respondents have not received letters for grant of leave sent by the petitioner. Since inspite of notice published in newspapers the petitioner did not join, the respondents treated the petitioner to be absent from duty without leave and terminated his service.

( 4 ) IT is admitted that the petitioner was appointed as a Class IV employee under the Dying in harness Rules. Appointments under the Dying in Harness Rules are permanent appointments. In ravi Karan Singh v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 1999 (3) UPLBEC 2263, a Division Bench of this court has held that appointment under the Dying in Harness Rules cannot