SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1999 Supreme(All) 197

ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
N.K. Mitra, CJ., D. K. Seth, J.
RAM KRIPAL SINGH - Appellant
Versus
U.P.STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, LUCKNOW - Respondents
Special Appeal 142 Of 1999
Decided On : 02/18/1999

Advocates Appeared:
Bhoopendra Nath Singh

N. K. MITRA, C. J. AND D. K. SETH, J.

( 1 ) THE preliminary objection taken by Mr. Vivek Saran, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1. 2 and 3 is that the appeal is not maintainable under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Allahabad high Court Rules. He pointed out that in the writ petition, the relief sought for, was in respect of an award passed by the labour court. Therefore, in view of the provisions provided in Chapter viii, Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, such appeal is not maintainable against an order of a single Judge passed in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect of an award passed by the tribunal.

( 2 ) MR. B. N. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, however, pointed out that it was not an award which was challenged in the writ petition. He pointed out that it was the duty of the State government to lodge appropriate complaint for non-implementation of an award by the respondent who is bound by the award. According to him, as contemplated in Section 14a of the u. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cognizance can only be taken in terms of Section 16 of the said Act only on a report of the District Magistrate or by any officer other than a District magistrate with the previous sanction in writing of the District Magistrate. Thus, cognizance can be taken only on the basis of a complaint lodged by the District Magistrate. The petitioner/appellant seeks mandamus on the authorities to discharge their statutory duty cast upon them under Section 14a read with Section 16 of the said Act. Therefore, it had no relation with the award. The award is not a subject-matter in the writ petition or the appeal. It was a subject-matter of the proceeding before the labour court but not in these proceedings.

( 3 ) WE have heard both the learned counsel at length.

( 4 ) IT appears that Mr. B. N. Singh has advanced a very attractive argument which almost impelled us to take a different view. But a proper reading of the prayers made show that whatever relief was asked for was in respect of an award, viz. :

"1. Issue a writ, order, direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to pay rs. 200 per day for breach of award as provided under Section 14-A of the U. P. Industrial disputes Act. 1947, from 15. 2. 1997 till the date of payment. 2. Issue a further writ, order, direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent nos. 1 and 2 to pay entire back wages, leave encashment/ex gratia alongwith 18% interest. "

In other words, in the said writ petition, the implementation of the award passed by the industrial Tribunal through Section 14a of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, is the principal relief that has been sought for. An award passed by the Labour Court or the Industrial tribunal is capable of being executed. U. P. Industrial Disputes Act in Section 14a provides that in case of non-implementation of the award by the employer, the employee may seek compensation while providing for penal action in addition. Such penal action, however, can be taken against an employer in the mode provided in Section 16 of the said Act.

( 5 ) THUS, the relief sought for under Section 14a of the said Act is in effect a relief relating to the implementation of the award. An order passed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution seeking implementation of an award is an order passed

"in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226. . . . . . of the Constitution in respect of an. . . . . "award (a) of a tribunal. . . . . . made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or Central Act. . . . . "

( 6 ) RULE 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules lays down

"that an appeal lies to the Court from a judgment. . . . . . in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made. . . . . . . in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Arti











Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top