The Labour Commissioner does not have jurisdiction to determine disputed questions of fact, such as the question of whether workmen are workmen of the principal employer or the contractor.

( 1 ) A reference as to whether a workman represented by respondent No. 3 was the workman of the petitioner company or of the contractor and whether the said workman should be considered to be holding a post as given in the schedule and, if so from which date is pending before the learned III Labour Court, Kanpur. In the meantime, an application was made by these workmen under the provisions of U. P. Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of; Wages) Act, 1978. In the said proceeding an objection was taken by the petitioner that the same is not maintainable since the authority discharging jurisdiction under the Timely Payment of Wages Act, cannot enter into a dispute which is within the purview of the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court particularly when such a dispute is pending. According to Mr. V. B. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be pre- empting the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and therefore the decision with regard to the character of the workmen since disputed by the petitioner employer was wholly without jurisdiction. According to him while discharging its; functions under the Timely payment of Wages Act, the authority is supposed to decide, an existing right. It cannot determine a disputed question and enter into the determination of a right, which is not flowing from an existing, position. He had elaborated his argument and supported the same with various judgments cited by him.

( 2 ) MR. B. N. Singh. learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contends that in view of the Contract Labour (Abolition and Regulation) Act the employees of the contractor are employees of the principal employer and as such it does not require any determination. Therefore, the order passed by the authority under the Timely Payment of Wages Act is wholly within the scope and ambit of the Jurisdiction of the said authority. He had relied on some decisions which will be referred to at appropriate stage.

( 3 ) I have heard both the learned counsel at length.

( 4 ) IN the impugned order, it has not been pointed out as to which kind of work the workmen used to perform. The Government Order dated April 24, 1990 prohibits employment or contract labour in the textile industries in respect of such operations of" processing and by such designation as mentioned in Schedule of the said Order. In Schedule 10, operations of processing and designations as specified respectively have been included. In the impugned order, it has not been pointed out that any of the workmen are within any of the 10 scheduled designations or operations. However. Mr. B. N. Singh draws my attention to the order of reference contained in annexure 6, which indicates in its schedule the department as reeling (sic) department, which is item No. 2 of the said Schedule 10. This question is seriously disputed by Mr. V. B. Singh. He has drawn my attention to the various statements and documents on the basis whereof such dispute is being sought to be supported. Admittedly, this very question is pending determination before the Labour Court in the reference. Therefore, this question is to be determined by the labour Court on the basis of the materials that might be produced by either of the parties. Simply on the basis of the reference or the indication made therein it does not seem to be material sufficient for this Court to come to a conclusion conclusively that the workmen were concerned with the particular department. Except the said order of reference, no material has been produced in this Court to support the contention of Mr. B. N. Singh to the extent that the workers were engaged in a department since been prohibited in Schedule 10. But then since the dispute is pending, if this Court exercises writ jurisdiction to determine the question it would be entering into disputed question of fact, that too without sufficient materials placed before it. In my view, such an exercise would be wholly unfounded on the principles on which the jurisd