YATINDRA SINGH, J.

( 1 ) WHAT is the status of a tenant after termination of his tenancy under Section 106 of the transfer of Property Act (the T. P. Act)? Can such a tenant claim adversely to his landlord? Is an application under Section 21 (1) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and eviction) Act. 1972 (the new Act) maintainable against such a tenant? These are the questions that arise in this writ petition. Here are the facts. Facts

( 2 ) SRI Om Prakash Gupta (the contesting respondent) is the landlord of the house in question. Petitioner is the tenant of the same. The contesting respondent terminated the tenancy of the petitioner by the notice dated 8. 1. 1972. At that time, the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 1947 (the old Act) was applicable. He waited for another twelve years and then filed an application on 5. 7. 1984 under Section 21 (1) (a) of the new Act for the release of the house in question. The Prescribed Authority rejected his application on 6. 12. 1993, but his appeal was allowed on 30. 9. 1999, hence the present writ petition. Points for Determination

( 3 ) SRI Vinod Prasad, counsel for the petitioner, has raised following points before me :

(i) The tenancy of the petitioner was determined on 8. 1. 1972. What was his status thereafter? was he a trespasser? Has he become owner of the house as twelve years had already expired at the time of filing the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the new Act? (ii) An application under Section 21 (1) of the new Act can be filed only against a tenant. Was petitioner a tenant after determination of his tenancy? Was any application, under Section 21 (1)of the new Act, maintainable against him? (iii) Has the contesting respondent made out the grounds for eviction of the petitioner under section 21 (1) (a) of the new Act? 1st Point : Possession of tenant after termination of tenancy-Permissive

( 4 ) SECTION 116 of the Evidence Act enacts a rule of estoppel between a landlord and a tenant. The privy Council in Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, held :

"a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title, however, defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord. "

This was approved by Apex Court in Atayam Veerraju v. Pechetti Venkajuia. One can, without adding any other authority, say a tenant, in possession of a premises, cannot deny the title of his landlord under whom he had entered, or from whom he has taken a renewal of his lease and to whom he has paid rent. A tenant cannot say that the landlord had no title at the time of his admission. Whether the landlord takes proceedings for ejectment, or rent, or use and occupation against his tenant, the tenant can neither set up the superior title of a third person, nor show that the landlord has no title. The only course for such a tenant (who wishes to set up superior title than his landlord), is to hand over the possession of the premises, and then take proceedings to recover it.

( 5 ) THE counsel for the petitioner submitted that the law explained in the previous paragraph is distinguishable on the wordings of Section 116 of the Evidence Act. He laid emphasis on the following words of Section 116 of the Evidence Act no tenant of Immovable property--shall during the continuance of the tenancy. According to him the tenancy was determined by the notice dated 8. 1. 1972, it came to an end ; there is no continuance of the tenancy ; and the bar of section 116 of the Evidence Act is not applicable. There are divergent opinions. Sarkar on the evidence 15th ed. page 1923 narrates the two views as follows :

"the doctrine of estoppel does not extend after the discontinuance of tenancy, that is to say. It is open to the tenant to question the title of the landlord who had inducted him, if the tenancy is terminated and possession surrender : and the tenancy may terminate by having run its prescribed course or by act

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