( 1 ) BINDING judicial precedent the concept and ambit of it, as also the parameters of the per incuriam rule, are what arise forconsideration in the context of the not infrequent instances of law laid down by a larger Bench being treated as, or said to be, incorrect by a single Judge, or a single Judge or a Division Bench doubting the correctness of what has been laid down not only by a co-ordinate but also a larger Bench or brushing it aside by applying to it the label of "per incuriam".

( 2 ) ILLUSTRATIVE of the imperative necessity of examining and clarifying the issues raised are two judgements of M. Katju, J. , one relating to cancellation of an arms licence and the other to the grant of it.

( 3 ) M. Katju, J. in Civil Misc. Petition 8374 of 1992 (Rana Pratap Singh v. State of U. P.) decided on 4/03/1992 when faced with the judgement of a five judge Full Bench in Kailash Nath v. State, (1985 AWC 493) and the earlier Full Bench decision in C. P. Sahu v. State of U. P. (1984 AWC 145 : 1986 Cri LJ 817 : AIR 1986 All 142 : 1986 All LJ 328 said, "with great respect to these Full Bench decisions, I am of the opinion that both of them are wrong. "

( 4 ) THE matter before the Full Bench in Kailash Nath, as also in C. P. Sahus case, 1984 AWC 145 : 1986 Cri LJ 817 (supra), concerned cancellation of an arms licence. It was held in the former that an arms licence may be cancelled without prior opportunity of hearing to the licensee but such licensee must be heard even subsequently. Post-decisional hearing was thus held to be not only valid but also necessary.

( 5 ) REGARDING such post-decisional hearing, in the view of Katju, J. , it could be resorted to in very exceptional cases, where a pre-decisional hearing would frustrate the very object of the proceedings. Citing the Full Bench of this Court in Balram Singh v. State (1988 AWC 1481 : 1989 All LJ 23 : 1990 Cri LJ 409), the learned Judge went on to say "if there is requirement of immediate action, the authorities can suspend the arms licence pending inquiry. Hence the object of the proceedings will not be frustrated if a hearing prior to cancellation is given". In Balram Singhs case 1988 AWC 1481 : 1990 Cri LJ 409 (supra) it had been held that a gun licence could be suspended during proceedings for its cancellation. It was on this rationale that the learned Judge concluded with the observations "i am of the respectful opinion that the two Full Bench decisions in C. P. Sahus case (1984 AWC 145 : 1986 Cri LJ 817) and Kailash Naths case 1985 AWC 493: AIR 1985 All 291 need are consideration by a larger Full Bench.

( 6 ) THE issue in contention before the learned single Judge, namely, grant of an opportunity of hearing to the licensee before cancellation of his licence stood fully and squarely covered by the judgement of the Full Bench in Kailash Naths case 1985 AWC 493 : AIR 1985 All 291 (supra) where, as pointed out earlier, it was held that there could be post-decisional hearing for suspension or revocation of the licence. This being so, the rationale thereof was clearly binding. upon the learned single Judge and yet, its correctness is being sought to be put under cloud. This is where the principle of binding judicial precedent comes in. To seek to explain it now, in this day and age, would not only be merely to state the obvious, but rather elementary and common place, at any rate, for the legal profession. The fact, however, that such a situation has come about, of course, impels us to spell out its true import.

( 7 ) IT was over a quarter of a century ago that the Supreme Court in T. P. Thakkar v. R. M. Patel (AIR 1968 SC 372) had occasion to say, "precedents which enunciate rules of law form the foundation of administration of justice under our system. It has been held time and again that a single Judge of a High Court is ordinarily bound to accept as correct judgements of Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and of Division Benches and of the Full Benches of his