IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
K. L. SHARMA
KAILASH CHAND AGRAWAL - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH - Respondents
CRI. M. A. 332 Of 1995
Decided On : 03/15/1995
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 397(2) - INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - SUMMONING ORDER - REVISION - MAINTAINABILITY - NOTICE OF HEARING - NECESSITY.
Fact of the Case:
The applicant filed a complaint case against the opposite party under various sections of the IPC. The Magistrate summoned the opposite party after examining the applicant and his witnesses under Section 202, Cr. P. C. The opposite party filed a revision against the summoning order before the Sessions Judge, who allowed the revision and set aside the summoning order. The applicant challenged the revision order in the High Court.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the revision against the summoning order was maintainable before the Sessions Judge as it was an intermediate order and not an interlocutory order. The Court also held that the revisional Court was not required to give notice of hearing to the applicant as hearing of a party in a criminal revision is not an absolute right.
Issues: 1. Whether the revision against the summoning order was maintainable before the Sessions Judge? 2. Whether the revisional Court was required to give notice of hearing to the applicant?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The expression "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the Cr. P. C. has been used in a restricted sense and denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important right or liability of the parties. An order which essentially affects the right of the accused is not an interlocutory order. 2. A summoning order passed under Section 204 of the Cr. P. C. is an intermediate order and is amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court or the High Court. 3. Hearing of a party in a criminal revision under Section 397, Cr. P. C. is not an absolute right. The revisional Court may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may give the necessary direction.
Final Decision: The petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. was dismissed.
( 1 ) THIS is a petition under Section 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing the order dated 22-4-1994 passed by VI Additional Sessions Judge, Aligarh in Criminal Revision No. 42 of 1994, Ram Kishan v. State.
( 2 ) I have heard Sri. I. M. Khan counsel for applicant as well as learned A. G. A. and perused the material brought on record.
( 3 ) THE applicant filed a complaint case against the opposite party Nos. 2 to 5 under Sections 342, 323, 504, 506, 348, I. P. C. before the C. J. M. Aligarh and examined himself and his two witnesses Ashok Kumar P. W. 1 and Rakesh Kumar P. W. 2 under Section 202, Cr. P. C. The learned C. J. M. was pleased to find a prima facie case and summoned the opposite party Nos. 2 to 5 by his order dated 29-10-1993. They filed a Criminal Revision No. 42 of 1994 before the Sessions Judge, Aligarh which was heard and decided by the VI Additional Sessions Judge Aligarh who was pleased to allow the revision and set aside the summoning order dated 29-10-1993 and discharged the revisionists-opposite party Nos. 2 to 5. The complainant felt aggrieved against this order passed in criminal revision.
( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant has contended that the learned Sessions Judge did not have jurisdiction under Section 397 (2), Cr. P. C. to entertain the revision against the summoning order which was of interlocutory nature. In support of his contention, he has referred to the decisions of this Court in the case of Kailash Chaudhary v. State of U. P. , 1994 Cri LJ 67, and Anil Kumar Mathur v. State of U. P. , 1994 ACC 535. It is true that against the summoning order passed by the Magistrate in complaint case, it has been decided that the personsummoned on ex parte consideration of material or evidence must appear and file objection before the same Court which is competent to recall the ex parte order and can even drop the proceeding if it is satisfied that the case is not made out. But these decisions do not totally create a bar before the Court of Sessions or the High Court for entertaining a revision against a summoning order. In the leading cases of Madhu-Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 (4) SCC 551 : AIR 1978 SC 47); Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2185 and V. C. Shukla v. State, AIR 1980 SC 962, the Honble Supreme Court has held that the expression interlocutory order has been used in Section 397 (2) of the Code with a restricted sense. It denoted order of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important right or liability of the parties and any order which essentially affects the right of the accused is not an inerlocutory order. The following observations made by the Honble Supreme Court are worth reproduction :- ". . . But undoubtedly in the context of Section 397 (2) read with Section 482 of the Code, this Court with a view to providing a judicial umbrella of active supervision for reaching possible correctable justice by activist attitude and pragmatic interpretation found a third class of orders neither interlocutory nor final but intermediate and, therefore, outside the bar of Section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. . . Having given a thoughtful consideration my humble view is that the Supreme Court in V. C. Shuklas cases (supra) has upheld the view taken by Honble UNTWALIA, J. (as he then was) in Madhu Limayes case (supra) that sub-Section (2) of Section 397 of the new Code kept purely interlocutory orders beyond the purview of sub-Section (1) of Section 397 and not intermediate orders. In other words, intermediate orders are amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of either the Sessions Court or the High Court, what is an intermediate order ? The meaning of this term is contained in volume 60 of the Corpus Juris Secondum, It says :"an intermediate order has been defined as the one made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgement. ""and this has been approved by the Supreme Court in V. C. Shuklas case (supr
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