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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
R. B. Mehrotra and R. K. Singh, JJ.
MOHD.SAYEED - Appellant
Versus
REHANA BEGUM - Respondents
First Appeal 459 Of 1991
Decided On : 12/22/1995
FAMILY COURTS ACT - JURISDICTION - MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON DIVORCE) ACT - APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 3 - WHETHER FAMILY COURT HAS JURISDICTION - INTERPRETATION OF PROVISIONS - APPLICABILITY OF FAMILY COURTS ACT TO MUSLIM COMMUNITY - DEFINITION OF PROCEEDINGS, DISTRICT COURT, AND CIVIL COURT - SCOPE OF SECTION 7 OF FAMILY COURTS ACT - APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 3(2) OF MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON DIVORCE) ACT TO FAMILY COURTS - JURISDICTIONAL OBJECTION RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN APPEAL - APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
Fact of the Case:
Two First Appeals were filed challenging the jurisdiction of the Family Court to pass orders under The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (the Act). In both cases, the respondents, Muslim women, had filed petitions under Section 3(2) of the Act seeking maintenance, recovery of dower (Mehar), and restoration of dowry given in marriage. The Family Court had passed orders in favor of the respondents, directing the appellants, their husbands, to make payments and restore the properties.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the Family Court had jurisdiction to pass orders under Section 3(2) of the Act. It interpreted the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984, and the Act to conclude that an application under Section 3 of the Act could be considered a proceeding within the meaning of the Family Courts Act. The Court also held that the Family Court was deemed to be a District Court or Subordinate Civil Court for the area to which its jurisdiction extended, and thus had the jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 3 of the Act. The Court further held that the appellants could not raise the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the appeal, as they had not objected to the jurisdiction of the Family Court during the proceedings.
Issues: 1. Whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to pass orders under Section 3(2) of the Act. 2. Whether an application under Section 3 of the Act could be considered a proceeding within the meaning of the Family Courts Act. 3. Whether the Family Court was deemed to be a District Court or Subordinate Civil Court for the area to which its jurisdiction extended. 4. Whether the appellants could raise the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court interpreted the provisions of the Family Courts Act and the Act to conclude that an application under Section 3 of the Act could be considered a proceeding within the meaning of the Family Courts Act. 2. The Court held that the Family Court was deemed to be a District Court or Subordinate Civil Court for the area to which its jurisdiction extended, and thus had the jurisdiction to entertain applications under Section 3 of the Act. 3. The Court held that the appellants could not raise the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the appeal, as they had not objected to the jurisdiction of the Family Court during the proceedings.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed both appeals with costs, upholding the jurisdiction of the Family Court to pass orders under Section 3(2) of the Act. The Court also exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to approve the impugned judgment in the extraordinary circumstances of the case.
( 1 ) BOTH the aforesaid First Appeals have been been filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts act and the common question of law involved in both the aforesaid First Appeals, is as to whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to pass orders under, The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ?
( 2 ) BEFORE appreciating the question of jurisdiction of the Family Court, it is necessary to notice the facts of the cases of both aforesaid Appeals. In First Appeal No. 642 of 1991, Smt. Rehana begum, respondent herein, filed a petition under Section 125 of Cr. P. C. against her husband, mohd. Sayeed with the allegation that they were married according to Muslim rites and customs on 11. 4. 1986and from their wedlock a daughter named Shabana, who was aged about one year at the time of the filing of the petition, was born. Mohd. Sayeed, the appellant herein, informed by a letter to his wife, Smt. Rehana that he has divorced his wife. The aforesaid divorce letter was received on 14. 3. 1989 and the petition filed by Smt. Rehana, under Section 125 of Cr. P. C, was converted into proceedings under the Act.
( 3 ) ON a detailed consideration of pleadings of the parties and evidence led by the parties the judge, Family Court, Bareilly vide his judgment dated 27. 9. 1991, directed the husband, namely, mohd. Sayeed, the appellant herein, to pay Rs. 2500/- by way of Mehar to his wife, Smt. Rehana and Rs. 5000/- as value of the articles given to him in dower and maintenance at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month for three months being the period of Iddat and Rs. 100/- per month by way of maintenance for Shabana, the daughter of the appellant from 5. 4. 1989 i. e. the date of the petition.
( 4 ) IN First Appeal No. 459 of 1991 Smt. Naseema Bi, filed a petition for maintenance for the period of Iddat, recovery of dower (Mehar) and the restoration of the dowry given in marriage against her husband, namely, Sri Habib Mian under Section 3 (2) of the Act. The Judge, Family court, Bareilly vide his judgment dated 20. 7. 1991 directed the husband, namely, Sri Habib mian, the appellant herein, to pay to his wife a sum of Rs. 30,000/- as Mehar, Rs. 1500/-as maintenance for the period of Iddat, to restore the articles shown in the list Ex. Kha- 1 or to pay value thereof amounting to Rs. 73,720/- and also to restore the articles given in present to his wife or their value amounting to Rs. 23,000/ -.
( 5 ) IN both the aforesaid First Appeals we have gone into through the impugned judgments and the material evidence placed on record by the parties and we are fully satisfed that the judgments do not suffer from any error of fact or of law. On a thread bare consideration of the evidence, the family Court in both aforesaid matters, has recorded findings of fact and having been satisfied on the basis of the material on record, have delivered the impugned judgments.
( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant in both the cases has failed to point out any material on record to demonstrate that the findings recorded by the Judge, Family Court in both the aforesaid matters, is not in accordance with the evidence or any other view can be taken from the evidence on record. No question of law arises for consideration in the two impugned judgments. Before the Family Court, the appellants herein, who were respondents before the Family Court, did not raise any objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Family Court to decide the application of the respondents under Section 3 (2) of the Act. In the grounds of appeal also no ground has been specifically taken to the effect that the Family Court had no jurisdiction to pass orders under section 3 (2) of the Act.
( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant in support of his contention has placed reliance on two decisions of this Court wherein this Court has taken a view that the Family Courts established under 1984 Act had no jurisdiction to pass orders under Sectio
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