1998 Supreme(All) 448
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
J. C. Gupta, J.
AJAY KUMAR JAISWAL - Appellant
Versus
SHANTI SINGH - Respondents
C. M. W. P. 13515 Of 1998
Decided On : 04/17/1998
Avinash, Dharam Pal Singh
The word "building" used in clause (g) of Section 2(1) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 denotes the entire building and is not confined only to the accommodation in occupation of the petitioner.
Headnote:
U.P. URBAN BUILDINGS (REGULATION OF LETTING, RENT AND EVICTION) ACT, 1972 - SECTION 2(1)(G) - INTERPRETATION - BUILDING - MEANING - RENT OF ACCOMMODATION IN OCCUPATION OF TENANT EXCEEDING RS. 2,000 PER MONTH - ACT NOT APPLICABLE TO THAT ACCOMMODATION - RENT OF ANOTHER PORTION IN BUILDING COMPLEX LET OUT TO ANOTHER TENANT AT HIGHER RENT - IRRELEVANT.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioner challenged the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declaring the disputed accommodation vacant and the order of the revisional court remanding the matter to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for a fresh decision on the release application moved by the landlady. The petitioner contended that the Act had ceased to apply as the total aggregate of rent of the building exceeded Rs. 2,000 per month.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the word "building" used in clause (g) of Section 2(1) of the Act denotes the entire building and is not confined only to the accommodation in occupation of the petitioner. The court further held that the rent paid by another tenant in a separate portion of the building complex cannot be added with that of the accommodation in question for the purposes of determining the ceiling limit of rent as contained in clause (g).
Issues: Whether the Act applies to a building where the rent of the accommodation in occupation of the tenant exceeds Rs. 2,000 per month, but the total aggregate of rent of the building complex exceeds Rs. 2,000 per month due to rent paid by another tenant in a separate portion of the building complex.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the word "building" used in clause (g) of Section 2(1) of the Act to mean an independent allottable accommodation, whether singly situated or is part of a building complex. The court held that the Act applies to a building in occupation of the concerned tenant or in other words to that tenement which is the subject-matter of dispute and not to the whole building complex which may be having several separate and independent tenements.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition, holding that the Act was applicable to the accommodation in question and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter.
( 1 ) HEARD petitioners counsel.
( 2 ) THIS is tenants petition challenging the order dated 20. 3. 1998 passed by respondent No. 2 and the orders dated 15. 1. 94 and 15. 9. 94 passed by the respondent No. 3.
( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, the disputed portion of House No. C-26/35-A-ID, Mohalla Bagh kanhaiya Lal, Lahura Veer (Ram Katora), Varanasi was let out to the petitioner by Smt. Shanti devi, respondent No. 1 on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000 on 1. 1. 1991 and since then he is in occupation thereof with the consent of the landlady, respondent No. 1. On 4. 11. 1993, an application was moved by Shri Ram Singh for allotment of the said accommodation and on the basis of which the Rent Control and Eviction Officer proceeded to make an enquiry and by his order dated 15. 1. 94 declared the accommodation in question vacant. Thereafter the respondent no. 1 landlady moved an application for release under Section 16 of the Act. The said application was, however, rejected by the respondent No. 2 by the order dated 15. 9. 94. The respondent No. 1 challenged the said order by filing Revision No. 180/1994 before the District judge, Varanasi. In that revision, the petitioner applied for impleadment. The application for impleadment was, however, rejected by the Additional District Judge by the order dated 7. 2. 1995. The petitioner challenged the said order before this Court in Writ Petition No. 4625 of 1995. The writ petition was also dismissed by this Court by the order dated 27. 5. 1997. The respondent No. 2 by the order dated 20. 3. 98 allowed the revision filed by the landlady and has remanded the matter to the respondent No. 2 for a fresh decision on the release application moved by the landlady.
( 4 ) IT is noteworthy that while declaring vacancy, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had specifically held in the order dated 15. 1. 94 that the premises in question was governed by the provisions of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 and since the letting has been made in contravention of the provisions of the Act, the petitioner would be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation and a vacancy was in existence in law. The petitioner did not challenge the said order, on the other hand, himself applied for allotment. Since the landlady had also moved an application for the release of the disputed premises, her application was considered first and was rejected by the respondent No. 2 by the order dated 15. 9. 94. The landlady challenged the said order in the revision. During the pendency of the said revision, the petitioner moved an application for impleading him as a party but that application was rejected and the order rejecting the said application was upheld by this Court by the order dated 27. 5. 97 passed in Writ Petition No. 4625 of 1995. It was contended before this Court that since the landlords application was rejected on the objection and the evidence led by the petitioner, he was entitled to be heard in the revision. This contention was turned down by this Court, and it was observed :
"the petitioner has not challenged the order declaring the vacancy. Once an order is passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declaring vacancy, no person can claim any right to remain in occupation as a tenant or otherwise. "
It was further observed :"the contention of the petitioner, that he was earlier a tenant and, therefore, was entitled to be heard in revision, cannot be accepted. As a prospective allottee, he has no right to contest the release application. The Full Bench in Talib Hasan and another v. Ist Additional District Judge, nainital and others, 1986 (1) ARC 1, has held that the prospective allottee " has no right to contest the release application. The view of the Full Bench has been upheld by the Honble supreme Court in Vijai Kumar Sonkar v. Incharge District Judge and others. 1995 (2) ARC 1. "
( 5 ) IN view of these decisions, the view taken by respondent No. 2 does not suffer from any manifest error of law. It furthe