1998 Supreme(All) 858
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
BEFORE THE HONble D. K. SETH, J.
PRINCIPAL, JODHA SINGH INTER COLLEGE - Appellant
Versus
IST A.C.J.M., ETAWAH - Respondents
Civil Misc. Writ Petition 25894 Of 1992
Decided On : 08/12/1998
G.D.Misra, K.P.Bajpai, R.K.MISRA, Ramesh Upadhayay, U.C.MISRA
A suit for a declaration that termination of service is illegal and invalid and for payment of salary is maintainable if the employee is not a public servant as defined in the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976, and the bar of suit provided in the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, does not apply.
Headnote:
SERVICE TERMINATION - MAINTAINABILITY OF SUIT - U. P. PUBLIC SERVICE TRIBUNAL ACT, 1976, SECTION 6 - U. P. INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION ACT, 1921, SECTION 16G(4) - SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963, SECTIONS 14, 34 - ORDER 39, RULE 2, PROVISO (B) - U. P. INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT - A suit for a declaration that termination of service is illegal and invalid and for payment of salary is maintainable if the employee is not a public servant as defined in the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976, and the bar of suit provided in the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, does not apply.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, an employee of a recognized school, filed a suit for a declaration that his termination of service was illegal and invalid and that he was entitled to continue in service and receive salary. The trial court held that the suit was not maintainable. The petitioner appealed, arguing that the suit was maintainable under the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976, and the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the petitioner was not a public servant as defined in the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976, and therefore section 6 of the Act did not bar the suit. The court also held that the bar of suit provided in section 16G(4) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, did not apply to employees other than teachers, and therefore the petitioner's suit was maintainable.
Issues: 1. Whether the suit was barred by section 6 of the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976? 2. Whether the suit was barred by section 16G(4) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. Section 6 of the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976, does not bar suits by employees who are not public servants as defined in the Act. 2. Section 16G(4) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, does not bar suits by employees other than teachers.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the writ petition and held that the suit was maintainable.
( 1 ) THE petitioner had filed a suit for a declaration that his termination of service is illegal and invalid and that he is entitled to continue in service as well as to the payment of salary. A preliminary issue was framed as to the maintainability of the suit. The trial court had held that the suit is not maintainable. Against the said order, misc. Appeal No. 13 of 1989 was preferred. The said appeal was allowed and it was held that the suit is maintainable as framed. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. K. P. Vajpayee had argued that in view of the provisions contained in section 6 of the U. P. Public service Tribunal Act, the suit is not maintainable. He also contended that even if the suit is not barred by section 6 of the said Act by reason of Chapter III of the Regulation framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, the Civil Court cannot assume jurisdiction in respect of termination of service of an employee other than teachers.
( 2 ) SRI G. D. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 on the other hand contended that the civil suit is maintainable and he had referred to several judgments on this point. According to him, the petitioner not being a public servant within the meaning of section 2, clause (b), section 6 of the U. P. Public Service Tribunal act, 19, 1976 cannot be attracted. According to him by reason of this specific provision contained in section 16g (4) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, the bar of suit provided therein applies in relation to the persons covered by sub-section 3 thereof. Sub-sections coveres only the teachers and not other employees of a recognized school. The petitioner being other employee of a recognized school, such bar cannot operate against him in respect of filing of the suit.
( 3 ) AFTER having heard both the learned counsel, it appears that the petitioner cannot be said to be a public servant as defined in section 2 (b) of the U. P. Public Service Tribunal Act, 1976 since he is neither in the service nor in the pay of State Government nor of a local authority or any other corporation owned or controlled by the state Government. The said definition does not include an employee other than teachers in a recognized school. Therefore, section 6 of the said Act cannot be attracted to bar the suit in respect of termination of service as rightly contended by Mr. G. D. Misra, learned counsel for respondent that section 16 G (4) does not bar a suit in respect of termination of service of an employee other than teacher of a recognized school. Regulation 31 of Chapter III of the said Regulation framed under the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, does not specify that a suit is barred while prescribing certain other remedies therein. When Section 16 G (4) has deliberately omitted to include other employees while creating bar of suit in respect of conditions of service, the same embargo cannot be introduced through rules, which the Act had omitted to incorporate. There cannot be any rule framed contradicting the Act itself. Therefore, the bar provided in the U. P. Intermediate Education Act against filing of the suit, does not operate in respect of termination of service of an employee other than teacher in a recognized school.
( 4 ) NOW such suit is subject to section 14 of the specific Relief act in respect of the contract of employment which cannot be specifically enforced. But this provision does not preclude a person from seeking a declaration of some right arising out of his employment under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. It was so held in the case of Ashok Kumar Srivastava Vs. National Insurance company Limited, reported in 1998 (33) A. L. R. 386. In the said judgement, it was held as follows :-
"though Specific Relief Act widens the spheres of the civil court its preamble shows that the Act is not exhaustive of all kinds of specific reliefs. "
An act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief. It is well to remember that