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1998 Supreme(All) 1045

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
S. R. Singh
RANVIR KUMAR - Appellant
Versus
JUDGE FAMILY COURT - Respondents
C. M. W. P. 24551 Of 1998
Decided On : 09/14/1998

Advocates Appeared:
A.D.Prabhakar, K.K.Arora

An order setting aside an ex parte decree of divorce is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, and is clearly appealable under the said provisions.

Headnote:

FAMILY COURT - SETTING ASIDE EX PARTE DECREE - APPEALABILITY - ORDER ALLOWING RESTORATION APPLICATION NOT AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - APPEAL LIES UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE FAMILY COURTS ACT, 1984.

Fact of the Case:

Petitioner filed a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of wilful neglect and desertion by the wife-respondent. The Family Court passed an ex parte decree for dissolution of marriage. The respondent-wife moved an application to set aside the ex parte order and the ex parte judgment and decree. The Family Court allowed the application and set aside the ex parte order and the ex parte judgment and decree. The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the order of the Family Court.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the order setting aside the ex parte decree of divorce is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, and is clearly appealable under the said provisions. The court further held that the order allowing or rejecting restoration application is not an interlocutory order within the ambit of Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, and is clearly appealable under the said provisions.

Issues: Whether the order setting aside the ex parte decree of divorce is an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984?

Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the following principles in reaching its decision: * An order setting aside an ex parte decree is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984. * The order allowing or rejecting restoration application is not an interlocutory order within the ambit of Section 19 (1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the petition.

S. R. SINGH, J.


( 1 ) CONSTANT marital bickering dnd consequent stand off between the petitioner and the respondent appears to be the causative factors for institution of a petition by the petitioner under Section 13 of the hindu Marriage Act. 1955, seeking dissolution of the marriage on the ground of wilful neglect and desertion by the wife-respondent herein. The learned Judge, Family Court passed an order on 29. 9. 1997 that the case would proceed exparte against the defendant. Thereafter, on the basis of exparte evidence, the matter escalated into a decree passed for dissolution of marriage vide judgment dated 16. 10. 1997, reinforced with the finding that "desertion and wilful neglect on the part of smt. Rekha Gupta is proved". On coming to know of the exparte judgment, the respondent-wife moved an application with the prayer to set aside the order dated 29. 9. 1997 and the judgment and decree dated 16. 10. 1997. The reason ior non-appearance on material dates was that she was residing with her father at Pathankot and owing to her own ailments, she could not attend the court as a result of which the case proceeded exparte against her and ultimately, the matter culminated in exparte decree on the basis of exparte evidence adduced by the husband. It is also alleged that she was stymed in appearing on the dates fixed in the case through a lawyer in that the lawyers are not permitted to prosecute the cases in Family Courts. The learned Judge Family court, deduced the cause for default and absence on the relevant dates to be sufficient and resultantly, set aside the order dated 29. 9. 1997 and the ex-parte judgment and decree dated 16. 10. 1997 by means of the order dated 25. 4. 98. Despaired of the order, the pethioner-husband has filed the instant petition for quashing the order dated 25. 4. 1998.

( 2 ) SRI A. D. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, to begin with, raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of appeal under Section. 19 of the family Courts Act, 1984, Sri K. K. Arora, appearing for the petitioner, tried to meet and controvert the preliminary based on the submissions that the order impugned herein has the complexion of an interlocutory order and therefore, no appeal lies against it. The learned counsel canvassed that as provided in sub-section (1), appeal lies against "every judgment or order, noi being an interlocutory order, of the family Court". Dwelling on his submission, the learned counsel urged that an order allowing application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC partakes of the nature of an interlocutory order in that the suit stands revived. Sri Arora made a further submission that an appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 cpc lies against an order rejecting an application for setting aside an exparte decree arid not against an order allowing the application under order 9, Rule 13 cpc. I have scanned the submissions made at the bar, for its substance. Section 19 of the family Courts Act, 1984, in so far as it is germane to the controversy involved in this petition, is excerpted below:"19. Appeal (1) Save as provided in subsection (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2) of 1974 or in any other law, an apppeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family court to the High Court both on facts and pn law. (2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties (or from an order passed under Chapter IX of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974): provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any appeal pending before a High Court or any order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) before the commencement of the Family courts (Amendment) Act, 1991 ). (3) x x x x (4) The High C






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