Back
1998 Supreme(All) 1082
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
D. K. Seth, J.
COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT, SHRI SHIVAJI NATIONAL INTER COLLEGE, HANSIPUR, - Appellant
Versus
DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS, MIRZAPUR AND ANOTHER - Respondents
C. M. W. P. 27885 Of 1998
Decided On : 09/18/1998
Arun Tandon, K.R.SINGH, SURENDRA TIVARI
The scope of the District Inspector of Schools' authority under Section 16g(7) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, is limited to determining whether there is sufficient material to justify the management's opinion that the charges warrant suspension or if the teacher's continuance in office would hamper disciplinary proceedings. The DIS is not empowered to hold a parallel inquiry or examine the evidence and materials to determine the merits of the charges.
Headnote:
UP INTERMEDIATE EDUCATION ACT, 1921 - SECTION 16G(5), (7) AND (8) - SUSPENSION OF TEACHERS - APPROVAL BY DISTRICT INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS - SCOPE AND JURISDICTION.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners, teachers in a school, challenged the order of the District Inspector of Schools (DIS) refusing to approve the order of suspension passed by the school management. The DIS had examined the evidence and materials produced by the management and the delinquent teachers and concluded that the charges against the teachers could not be proved.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the DIS had exceeded his jurisdiction under Section 16g(7) of the Act by examining the evidence and materials and coming to a conclusion on the merits of the charges. The scope of the DIS's authority was limited to determining whether there was sufficient material to justify the management's opinion that the charges warranted suspension or if the teacher's continuance in office would hamper disciplinary proceedings.
Issues: 1. Whether the DIS had the authority to examine the evidence and materials produced by the management and the delinquent teachers in deciding whether to approve the order of suspension. 2. Whether the DIS's scope of authority was limited to determining whether there was sufficient material to justify the management's opinion that the charges warranted suspension or if the teacher's continuance in office would hamper disciplinary proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court interpreted Section 16g(7) of the Act and held that the DIS's authority was limited to determining whether there was sufficient material to justify the management's opinion that the charges warranted suspension or if the teacher's continuance in office would hamper disciplinary proceedings. 2. The Court reasoned that the DIS was not empowered to hold a parallel inquiry or examine the evidence and materials to determine the merits of the charges. Such an exercise would be beyond the scope and ambit of Section 16g(7) and would effectively preempt the jurisdiction of the management.
Final Decision: The Court quashed the DIS's order and directed him to decide the question of approval or refusal of the suspension order in accordance with the law and the observations made in the judgment. The Court also directed the management to conclude the inquiry against the delinquent teachers within six months, failing which the suspension would automatically cease to exist.
( 1 ) THE order suspending the petitioners having since been refused to be approved by the District inspector of Schools by an order dated 2nd June, 1998, pursuant to the direction contained in the order dated 6th February, 1998, passed in Writ Petition No. 4329 of 1998 by this Court, has since been challenged in this writ petition. Mr. Arun Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that while disapproving the order of suspension by the school authority, the District inspector of Schools has over-stepped the limit of Jurisdiction conferred on him under Section 16g (7) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, in that he had asked for a reply from the delinquent and had examined the evidence that might be put forth in defence as well as the materials produced by the Committee of Management and had come to a conclusion that the charges could not be proved or established and as such, he has refused to approve. Therefore, according to him. the order is wholly without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed and the district Inspector of School should be directed to decide the question afresh in accordance with law within the ambit of. Section 16g (5) and (7), read with Regulation 39, Chapter III of the regulation framed under the 1921 Act.
( 2 ) THIS contention of Mr. Tandon has since been opposed by Mr. Surendra Tewari, counsel for the delinquent respondents as well as Mr. K. R. Singh, learned standing counsel. Mr. Tewari had contended relying on various decisions that the Districl Inspector of Schools by virtue of Section 16g (5] is empowered to scrutinize the papers sent to him by virtue of regulation 39 of Chapter III of the Regulation framed under the 1921 Act in order to ascertain as to whether the. Committee of Management had formulated its opinion having regard to clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (5 ). In the present case, the District Inspector of Schools, according to him has acted within the scope and ambit of his jurisdiction. Therefore, sitting in writ jurisdiction, this Court should not interfere with the finding of fact, particularly when the order is reasoned one. He also draws my attention to the fact that on two earlier occasions, the petitioners were suspended and since no papers were forwarded along with the order of suspension as required under Regulation 39 of Chapter III of the Regulation framed under the 1921 Act, on both the occasions the order of suspension was disapproved by the District inspector of School. The Committee of Management had suspended him on the third occasion when certain papers were forwarded. In this background, the District Inspector of Schools was justified to scrutinize the papers and come to such a finding. According to him. sub-section (8)provides for hearing, which is also implicit tn sub-section (7 ). which also requires hearing before ascertaining as to whether approval should be granted or not. According to him. otherwise, the entire purpose of providing the provision for grant of approval to an order of suspension and the conditions on which the delinquent can be suspended, would be completely frustrated. He contends that while interpreting a section, it has to be interpreted according to the scheme further the object and purpose and not impair. On this ground, relying on the decisions cited by him in support of his contention he submits that the writ petition should be dismissed.
( 3 ) MR. K. R. Singh, learned standing counsel, on the other hand contends that since Regulation 39. Chapter III of the Regulation requires forwarding the papers, it is open to the District inspector of Schools to look into the same and come to its independent decision as to whether, he should grant or refuse the approval to the order of suspension. !n deciding such question, the district Inspector of Schools has to find out as to whether the tests laid down in sub-section (5)of Section 16g are satisfied, namely, whether the charges are serious enough to merit hi
