A compromise entered into between the landlord and the tenant, wherein the tenant admits the need of the landlord, can be accepted by the Prescribed Authority and an order can be passed on the basis of such compromise.

( 1 ) HEARD Sri Pramod Kumar Jain counsel appearing for the petitioner. Sri Pankaj Mittal appears for the respondent No. 2 and he has also been heard.

( 2 ) BY Means of this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certtorari quashing the orders dated 7. 8. 92 and 15/16. 9. 98 passed by respondent No. 1.

( 3 ) FACTS relevant for this writ petition may be stated in brief. The landlord-respondent No. 2 moved an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972, (hereinafter referred to as the act ). The petitioner-tenant filed written statement denying the landlords need. Parties adduced evidence on affidavits. However, thereafter the petitioner entered into compromise with the landlord admitting therein that the need of the landlord for additional accommodation was genuine and bona fide. She also undertook to vacate the premises in question by 31. 12. 1995 to which the landlord also agreed, it was also provided in the compromise that if the petitioner failed to vacate the house in question by the aforesaid date, the landlord would be entitled to get her evicted in proceedings under Section 23 of the Act. The Prescribed Authority accepted the said compromise and decided the release application of the landlord in terms of the same by the order dated 11. 10. 91. However, it appears that on account of an accidental error the operative portion of the order mentioned that the application for release was rejected. Thereafter the landlord moved an application purporting to be under Section 151, C. P. C. read with Section 34 of the Act and Rule 22 (f) of the Rules for the correction of the order dated 11. 10. 91. By the order dated 7. 8. 92, the Prescribed Authority rectified the said accidental error and accordingly order dated 11. 10. 91 was corrected and the application for release under Section 21 was allowed with the direction that the tenant would vacate the premises in question and hand over its possession to the landlord on or before 31. 12. 95 as per the terms of the compromise and in case she failed to do so the landlord was entitled to get the same vacated under Section 23 of the Act at the cost of tenant. It appears that thereafter the petitioner moved an application for recalling the order dated 7. 8. 92 on the ground that the Prescribed Authority had no power to review its earlier order. The said application has been rejected by the impugned order dated 16. 9. 98.

( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner argued before the Court that there was no provision either under the Act or in the Rules permitting the Prescribed Authority to review the order dated 11. 10. 91 and therefore, the impugned order dated 7. 8. 92 was without jurisdiction. This argument of the learned counsel has no substance inasmuch as perusal of the order dated 7. 8. 92 makes it clear that as a matter of fact, the Prescribed Authority has not reviewed his own earlier order and he has merely corrected a clerical error which had crept in accidentally in the order dated 11. 10. 91. A bare reading of the order dated 11. 10. 91 leaves no room of doubt that the Prescribed authority accepted the compromise entered into between the landlord and the tenant and also accepted the tenants admission that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine and the application for release was to be allowed. However, it appears that instead of using the Hindi word nistarit, inadvertently the word nirast was typed in the operative portion of the order. This was an accidental error which could be corrected by the Prescribed Authority at any time. It is well-established law that every Court/tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers has in it inherent power to correct its own mistakes which occur accidentally or by a typing error.

( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner then argued that the order dated 11. 10. 91 as corrected by the subsequent order dated 7. 8. 92 is not enforceable in law as that order was not in acc