An employer cannot circumvent the statutory provisions of the Act by issuing temporary appointment letters to a workman who has completed more than 240 days of continuous service, and such termination of services without notice pay or retrenchment compensation is illegal and invalid.

( 1 ) BY means of this writ petition, the petitioner, the employer, has prayed for quashing the award dated 6. 5. 1991 published on 5. 10. 1991 by the Labour Court (Vth), U. P. , Kanpur, respondent no. 1.

( 2 ) RESPONDENT No. 2 whose services were terminated with effect from 12. 9. 1988 by the petitioner raised an industrial dispute claiming that his services have been Illegally and arbitrarily terminated by the petitioner company and a reference was made under Section 4k of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to the Labour Court. respondent No. I which was registered as Case No. 229 of 1988. Before the Labour Court, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that respondent No. 2 was employed for a fixed period from 3. 9. 1988 to 30. 9. 1988 and it was clearly stated in the appointment letter that the appointment was purely temporary in nature and services were liable to be terminated at any time without notice and without assigning any reason. Since respondent No. 2 absented himself from Job with effect from 10. 9. 88 without any reason, his services being for a limited period were dispensed with effect from 12. 9. 88 and he had been paid salary till the date of termination of service. According to the petitioner, the respondent No. 2 was neither entitled to notice pay nor retrenchment compensation as it was a case of voluntary abandonment of employment. It was further stated that appointment of respondent No. 2 was purely temporary in nature to meet the exigencies of work or to fill up leave vacancies from time to time as no vacancy of permanent in nature was available in the employers office at Kanpur.

( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 2 filed his written statement stating therein that he was appointed temporarily on substantive and permanent post of clerk-cum-typist initially on a consolidated salary of Rs. 750 per month and the initial appointment was from 1. 10. 87 to 31. 10. 87 which was extended from time to time. The work and conduct of respondent No. 2 had been efficient and his persistent demand to the management to desist from unfair labour practice and allow him for regular employment remained in vain and this seriously prejudiced and annoyed the management and, therefore, his services were abruptly terminated with effect from 12. 9. 98 without any rhyme and reason and without giving any notice pay or retrenchment compensation. According to his case the impugned termination order of the petitioner was illegal, arbitrary and violative of the provisions of Section 6n, Section 6p and Section 6q of the Act. It was further pleaded that the management did not follow the principle of "first come last go" and he was afforded no opportunity of hearing and there has been violation of principles of natural Justice.

( 4 ) BEFORE the Labour Court, parties adduced evidence and on a consideration thereof, the Labour court repelled the petitioners contention and made the impugned award dated 6. 5. 1991 holding that the termination of the services of the respondent No. 2 was Illegal and improper and ordered reinstatement of respondent No. 2 with full back wages and consequential benefits from 1. 9. 98.

( 5 ) SHRI S. M. Dayal, learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the impugned award mainly on three grounds which will be dealt with in this Judgment in subsequent paragraphs.

( 6 ) THE first ground of attack of Shri Dayal is that respondent No. 2 was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2 (z) of the Act and as such, there could not arise any industrial dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 2, therefore, the reference made under Section 4k of the Act was incompetent and without jurisdiction. In order to appreciate this argument of the learned counsel, it may be necessary to have a glance on the relevant definition and provisions of the Act. Section 2 (k) defines Industry as follows :

" (k) industry means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of