The punishment for misconduct should be commensurate with the gravity of the offence and should not be disproportionate to the extent that it shocks the conscience.

( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against an award dated 12th august, 1986 given by the Presiding Officer of Labour Court U. P. Bareilly in Adjudication Case no. 11/84.

( 2 ) PETITIONER was appointed as a Conductor in the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport corporation (hereinafter referred to as the U. P. S. R. T. C.) in March, 1973. It is alleged that on 22nd November, 1980 the petitioner along with his friend in drunken state entered in the office of bus station, Rampur and twisted the arm of one Shiv Daual and further abused another employee of the U. P. S. R. T. C. Accordingly, the petitioner was placed under suspension and was served with a charge-sheet dated 29th November, 1980. Subsequently by an order dated 13th july, 1981 the Assistant Regional Manager, Moradabad dismissed the petitioner from service. He further directed that the suspension allowance which has not been paid to the petitioner shall be forfeited. Since a dispute arose between the petitioner and the U. P. S. R. T. C. the State government by an order dated 4th January, 1984 referred the matter of dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court, Bareilly. The Labour Court, Bareilly by the impugned award held that the dismissal of the petitioner from service was valid and the petitioner ; is not entitled to any relief. It is at this stage that the petitioner has come up to this Court by means of this petition under article 226 of the constitution.

( 3 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Sri Mohd. Jafar, learned counsel for the petitioner, raised only one submission to the effect that the punishment of dismissal awarded to the petitioner is disproportionate to the gravity of offence and as such the extreme penalty of dismissal from service be set-aside. This plea, as ; raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, was also raised before the Labour Court and the same was rejected. The questions which arise for consideration are as to whether it is open to this Court to enter into the quantum of punishment awarded to the petitioner and further as to whether the punishment awarded to the petitioner is too severe, seeing the nature of offence alleged against the petitioner.

( 4 ) SO far as the first question is concerned, the decisions of English Court, Supreme Court as well as of this Court are on one line. In Council of Civil Service Union v. Minister for the Civil service (1984)3 Aller935. it was held as thus:: "judicial review has I think developed to a stage when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify: under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call illegality, the second irrationality and the third procedural impropriety. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of proportionality which is recognised, in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community. . . . " the aforesaid view was followed in Ranjit. Thakur v. Union of India (1988-I-LLJ-256) and it was observed as thus (p. 262): "the question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from c