The right of appeal is a substantive right and survives the repeal of the Act under which it was created. However, the forum where the appeal is to be filed and the limitation period for filing the appeal are matters of procedure and are not saved by the repealing Act.

( 1 ) A preliminary question as to the maintainability of the appeal has come up for consideration in the present appeal.

( 2 ) ON an award being made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under S. 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereafter old Act) on a date prior to 1-7-1989 an appeal purporting to be one under S. 110-D of the said Act was filed after 1-7-1989. It may be stated that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the new Act) was enforced w. e. f. 1-7-1989 and under S. 217 of the new Act the 1939 Act was specifically repealed in the new Act an appeal is provided against the award of the Claims Tribunal under S. 173 but it is hedged in with a condition that such an appeal will not be entertained by the High Court by a person who is required to pay any amount under the award unless he deposits twenty five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount awarded, whichever is less.

( 3 ) SRI A. B. Saran, learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted that despite repeal of the old Act the right of appellant to file an appeal under S. 110-D of the old Act survived and the appellant cannot be compelled to take recourse to S. 173 of the new Act and be subjected to such onerous conditions as are now imposed under the new provisions. His submission was that by repeal of the old Act and its substitution by a new one on the same subject the substantive right of a party cannot be adversely affected and an appeal as provided by the old Act can still be lodged.

( 4 ) THE effect of repeal on the pending proceedings or the rights already accruing under the old Act has been subjected of judicial interpretation in numerous decisions. The consistent view has been that the repeal or amendment of an Act does not affect a right already in existence unless a contrary intention is made out expressly or by implication. Ordinarily the effect of the repeal of an enactment is to obliterate it completely from the records as if it had never been passed and it must be considered as a law that never existed except for the purpose of those actions which were commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilst it was an existing law. The High Court of Madras while dealing with a case under S. 56 of the Transfer of Property Act, in Subbarama Reddiar v. Raghava Reddi, AIR 1955 Mad 439, held as under:"under S. 56 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, before the amendment of 1929, the mortgagee had a right, which accrued to him on the date of the mortgage itself, or realising, if he chose, the entire amount due to him from any part of the mortgaged property. Such a right was not subject to any right of marshalling at the instance of the purchaser of a portion of the hypothica. This right was not a mere privilege. Even assuming that all that the mortgagee had was privilege even then under S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, that privilege itself would not be taken away except by expressed enactment or necessary intendment by the amending Act. Therefore, not withstanding the amending Act which came into force by the time of the institution of the snit, rights of the parties are governed by the original S. 56 under which the purchaser of any portion of the hypothicated property did not have the right of marshalling as against the mortgage. "

( 5 ) THAT was, however, not a case of repeal of an Act but merely of amendment of certain provisions therein. Thus where there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in S. 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the Court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive