An award of a Labour Court does not merge in the judgment of a High Court dismissing a writ petition challenging the award. The award is executable under Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which provides an efficacious alternative remedy for its implementation.

( 1 ) THE applicant alleges disobedience by Sri D. C. Nautiyal, Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. , Lucknow. According to the submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant, the applicant had raised labour dispute which was referred to the Labour Court and the Labour Court upheld the claim of the workmen and directed that the workmen shall be treated as confirmed. The award of the labour Court was published on 5th April, 1986. The employer, namely, U. P. Rajkiya Nirman nigam Ltd. challenged the award through Writ Petition No. 4231 of 1986 which was dismissed by Judgment and Order dated 10th April, 1990. The submission of learned counsel is that the award of the Labour Court has merged in the judgment of this Court and, therefore, the opposite party has committed contempt of this Court by not implementing the award. The principle of merger applies to appeals. It does not apply to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It cannot, therefore, be said that the award of the Labour Court has merged in the Judgment of this Court. The award of the Labour Court is executable under Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There is no occasion, therefore, for the applicant to make the present application for contempt. Learned Counsel for the applicant has relied upon decision of Division Bench of gujarat High Court in Bipin Chandra B. Singhwala v. Navin Fluorine Industries and Anr. 1984 l. I. C. 1947 for submitting that the applicant does not have any efficacious alternative remedy for executing the award as the applicant will have to approach the State Government. It has been held that the remedy provided under Section 36-A was not efficacious for implementation of the award as that section does not confer any right on the employee to insist on any question being referred to the Labour Court. Section 36-A reads as follows:" 36-A (1)- if, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement, it may refer the question to such court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as it may think fit. " (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". This provision is attracted when there is any doubt as to the interpretation of an award or settlement or there is any difficulty in respect thereof. In such a situation, right of reference, of course, vests in the Government and not in the employee. It is for this reason that instead or insisting upon recourse to Section 36-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Gujarat High Court was of the opinion that the contempt application could be entertained. No such situation arises in the present case as it is not the case of the applicant that there is any doubt regarding interpretation of the award or that there is any difficulty in its implementation. The present case is squarely covered by Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act which reads as follows:

"33-C (1) - Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under settlement or an award. . . . . . . the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf. . . . . . . without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrears of land revenue. "

( 2 ) UNDER this provision, the only satisfaction the State Government is required to obtain is that the money is due. Once the State Government is satisfied that money is due, it has to issue certificate to the Collector for recovery thereof. It cannot, therefore, be said that the remedy of execution provided under Section 33-C is not efficacious. Under the first proviso, application under Section 33-C