Want of mutuality alone cannot render an agreement unenforceable for specific performance. The court should consider the entirety of facts and circumstances to determine the readiness and willingness of the party seeking specific performance.

( 1 ) HAR Vallabh plaintiff-respondent No. 2, was the Bhumidhar of plot No. 417 measuring 1-20 acres. The said plot is situated in village Kandeshi Pachar, District Etawah. On July 29, 1964, har Vallabh executed a sale deed of the said plot in favour of the defendant-appellant for a sale consideration of Rs. 800/ -. On the same date, it is alleged by the plaintiff, the defendant-appellant executed an agreement to transfer the property in favour of Smt. Saraswati devi, plaintiff-respondent No. 1, and Har Vallabh or any one of them. The plaintiffs-respondents served a notice on the defendant-appellant on Oct. 26, 1965, requiring him to execute a sale deed of the said plot in favour of Smt. Saraswati Devi alone as Har Vallabh was not possessed of sufficient means. The defendant-appellant replied to the said notice stating that he had only agreed to transfer the land in favour of Har Vallabh and he was under no legal obligation to do the same in favour of Smt. Saraswati Devi, On receipt of this reply, the plaintiffs-respondents sent another notice dated Nov. 24, 1965 to the defendant-appellant to execute a sale deed jointly in favour of Har Vallabh and Smt. Saraswati Devi, The defendant-appellant did not reply to the said notice.

( 2 ) THE above is a resume of the facts which have been concurrently found by the two courts below and these facts have not been rightly challenged before me. It is not in dispute, and it is also borne out from the record, that the plaintiffs-respondents instituted the suit for specific performance of the contract dated July 29. 1964 in the Court of Munsif on Dec. 22, 1965.

( 3 ) IT may be stated that it was urged before the courts below on behalf of the defendant-appellant that the plaintiffs-respondents bad failed to allege and prove that they had always been ready and willing to perform the agreement dated July 29, 1964 and were ready and willing to perform the same at the time of the institution of the suit, On this question, the two courts found in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents, In consequence of the said finding and the finding of fact summarised above, the trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents for specific performance and the said decree was maintained by the court of appeal.

( 4 ) ON behalf of the defendant-appellant, it has been urged that the document dated July 29, 1964 was not a contract and, as such, was not legally enforceable. It was further contended by him that the suit instituted by the plaintiffs-respondents on Dec. 22, 1965 was premature and was not legally maintainable. Lastly he repeated the submission which was made before the two courts below that the plaintiffs-respondents having failed to comply with the requirements of law contained in Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Form 47 contained in Appendix a of Civil P. C. , the suit should have been dismissed in limine. I shall presently deal with each of the submissions urged on behalf of the defendant-appellant.

( 5 ) IN support of his first submission, learned counsel drew my attention to Ext. 1, the agreement dated July 29, 1964. He submitted that the document had been executed only by the defendant-appellant and it did not contain the signatures of the plaintiffs-respondents. In other words, his argument was that the agreement Ext. 1 in order to be enforceable should have been a bilateral document and since it was only unilateral, it could not be deemed to be an agreement, In support of the first submission, he referred to the provisions contained in Section 2 of the Indian contract Act.

( 6 ) AFTER considering the submission of the learned counsel I find myself wholly unimpressed by his reasoning. As already pointed out above, two documents were executed on July 29, 1964. One of these documents was a sale deed by Har Vallabh in favour of the defendant-appellant and the other, which is the basis of the present suit, was an agreement to reconvey the property in favour o