In a suit for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff must aver and prove that they have been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract to be performed by them, as required by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

( 1 ) THIS second appeal has been preferred by Suraj Singh and his son Rameshwar Dayal who were defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in a suit for specific performance of an agreement dated January 17, 1967 for the sale of some agricultural plots situate in village Khajuri-Al-liyarpur in Tahsil mawara, District Meerut said to have been executed in favour of the plaintiffs by one Awan singh who was impleaded as defendant No. 1 in the suit but is a respondent in this appeal. The iiird Additional Civil Judge, Meerut, who tried the suit, granted a decree as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The Additional District Judge, Meerut before whom that decree was challenged in appeal by the present appellants affirmed the decree of the trial Judge. Under the decree, the sale deed was to be executed by the defendants in favour of the two plaintiffs and the present appellants, who were in possession of the land, were required to transfer it to the plaintiffs. Feeling aggrieved, these two defendants have come to this Court.

( 2 ) THE plaintiff alleged that through an agreement dated January 17, 1967, the first defendant contracted to convey the plots in question to them for a consideration of Rs. 10368. 75 out of which a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was paid by the plaintiffs as earnest money that very day. The remaining amount was to be paid by the plaintiffs at the time of the execution of the sale-deed before the Sub-Registrar and the sale-deed was to be executed by the first defendant by February 5, 1967. The first defendant, however, did not execute the deed of sale in their favour in spite of the fact that the plaintiffs required him to do so by a notice and also in spite of the fact that the plaintiff appeared before the Sub-Registrar on the date on which the sale-deed was to be executed. It has been averred in the plaint that with a view to deprive the plaintiffs of the rights which they had to the property under that agreement, the first defendant, namely, the vendor in collusion with the present appellants, who were his close relations, surreptitiously executed a sale-deed of the sale property in favour of the present appellants for a higher consideration. The plaintiffs, according to the averment contained in the plaint, were always ready and willing to get the same executed in their favour from after January 17, 1967 till the date of the suit.

( 3 ) THE defence of the present appellants, in the main, was that they had purchased the property in question for a consideration higher than that for which it was to be purchased by the two plaintiffs and further that they had no notice of the agreement of sale alleged by the plaintiffs to have been executed in their favour by the first defendant. The first defendant had, according to them, entered into an earlier agreement, for the sale of the property to them. Some other pleas were also raised in defence.

( 4 ) THE trial Judge framed several issues in the case. The first issue was as to whether the first defendant and the plaintiffs had entered into an agreement for the sale of the plots in dispute and was an agreement executed for the same on January 17, 1967. This issue was answered in favour of the plaintiffs by the trial court which did not accept the case of the defendants that no such agreement had been executed. The finding of the trial Judge in regard to this issue was upheld by the lower appellate Court.

( 5 ) ISSUE No. 5 framed by the trial Judge was to the effect whether the present appellants were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the agreement dated January 17, 1967 in favour of the plaintiff. The trial Judge answered this issue against the present appellants. He took the view that the first defendant was related to the present appellants and that the evidence of the defendants to show that the subsequent sale deed in their favour was a bona fide transaction was not acceptable. He also took the view that the plaintiffs evidence that the present appellants had knowled