The application of Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the abrogation of Section 5-A requirements in cases of urgency is subject to judicial review, but the courts' interference is limited to grounds of non-existence of material, non-application of mind, or mala fide.

( 1 ) ADARSHA Nagar Coop. Housing Society Ltd. , Kanpur, the petitioner, is a society registered under the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. Certain plots purchased by this society and owned by it were sought to be acquired by the respondents. A notification under Section 4 of the land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was accordingly issued on 8th Jan. , 1973, a copy where of has been filed as Annexure D to the writ petition. This notification indicates that the public purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired was "construction of residential quarters for the Married Air Force Personnel". This notification also stated that since the matter was one of urgency the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act will not be applicable. On the other hand the provisions of Section 17 (1) of the Act were applied. Subsequently on 23rd Jan. , 1973 a notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued. It is these two notifications which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition.

( 2 ) THREE submissions were made by Counsel for the petitioner-- (1) that the land sought to be acquired was neither waste nor arable and consequently Section 17 (1) of the Act could not be applied nor could the requirements of Section 5-A thereof be abrogated; (2) that no notice under section 9 of the Act was issued to the petitioner; and (3) that it was not a case of urgency and on this ground also neither Section 17 (1) of the Act could be applied nor could the requirements of section 5-A thereof be abrogated.

( 3 ) COINING to the first submission it would be seen that the land sought to be acquired according to the counter-affidavit, is bhumidhari land. There is no averment that there is any construction on the said land. In this view of the matter it is apparent that the land comes within the category of arable land. At this place we may point out that in paragraph 13 of the writ petition it has been stated that there are construction over plots Nos. 1086 and 1087. These two plots are, however, not sought to be acquired and as such the averments made in regard to these two plots are not to be considered. We accordingly find no substance in the submission that Section 17 (1) of the Act could not be applied because the land was neither waste nor arable.

( 4 ) COMING to the second submission it would be seen that in the counter-affidavit it has been stated in paragraph 12 thereof that notices under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued and served on Shri Ramesh Chandra in whose name the land sought to be acquired stood recorded in village papers. Paragraph 4 of the rejoinder affidavit indicates that Ramesh Chandra is the Secretary of the petitioner society and his name was ordered to be entered in village papers in that capacity. In this view of the matter the assertion that no notice under Section 9 was served on the petitioner cannot be accepted.

( 5 ) WE now come to the last submission made by counsel for the petitioner, viz. that this being not a case of urgency S 17 (1) of the Act could not be applied and the provisions of Section 5-A thereof were erroneously abrogated. In support of this submission considerable emphasis was laid by counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan v. State of maharashtra (AIR 1977 SC 183 ). It was urged that the purpose for which the acquisition was sought to be made in Narayans case (supra) was "development and utilisation of said land as a residential and industrial area". On its basis it was urged that since the purpose for which the petitioners land was sought to be acquired was also construction of residential quarters for married Air Force personnel, the purpose was almost analogous to that of Narayans case and since in that case it was held that Section 17 (1) of the Act had wrongly been applied the same view deserved to be taken in the instant case also. Having heard counsel for the parties, we however, find it difficult t