GANGESHWAR PRASAD, J.

( 1 ) THESE three second appeals arise out of three suits between the same parties and involve the same questions of fact and law and they may, therefore, be disposed of by common judgment.

( 2 ) THE suits were filed in the revenue court for declaration that the plaintiff is the exclusive sirdar of one of the disputed plots and a co-sirdar of the remaining three. The plaintiff claimed to be in possession but he prayed that the relief of possession may also be awarded to him in case he was found to be out of possession. The State Government and the Gaon Samaj, impleaded as defendants, remained absent and the suits were contested only by the other defendants, who denied the claim of the plaintiff and asserted that they were bhumidhars of the plots and were in possession as such. The suits were dismissed by the trial court and since the issue relating to bhumidhari rights, claimed by the contesting defendants, had been remitted to and decided by the civil Court, appeals were preferred to the Civil Judge who reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suits. The contesting defendants have come up in appeal to this Court.

( 3 ) IT is unnecessary to narrate In any detail the facts of the case and it is quite enough to mention briefly the findings recorded by the learned Civil Judge. He has found that the plots of which the plaintiff claims to be a co-sirdar had been let out to the plaintiff and Gaja defendant jointly by the fixed rate tenants thereof before the enforcement of Act I of 1951 and that since both of them had continued in possession as sub-tenants they acquired adhivasi rights and later became sirdars under the provisions of the said Act. He has further found that the plot of which the plaintiff claims to be the sole sirdar was let out to him by Gaja defendant and that the plaintiff had acquired rights of a sirdar on that account and also on account of having been in cultivatory possession in 1359 Fasli. It was not disputed before me by the learned counsel for the appellants that on the facts found established by the learned Civil Judge the conclusions reached by him regarding the title of the plaintiff were correct. The findings of the fact themselves were certainly sought to be challenged but they were not shown to be vitiated by any error which may constitute an error of law and as such they must be accepted in second appeal.

( 4 ) THE argument in these appeals really centred round the question whether the suits were liable to be dismissed on account of the fact that admittedly notice under Section 80 C. P. C. had not been given to the State Government which is a necessary party to the suits as provided by section 229-B of Act 1 of 1951. On this question the trial court was of the view that the suits were bad for want of notice but the lower appellate court held that the State Government, by not contesting the suits, waived its objection as to their maintainability, and want of notice could not therefore entail their dismissal. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the lower appellate court was in error in holding that the bar of the mandatory provisions of section 80 C. P. C. could be waived and that at any rate waiver of the objection as to want of notice could not be inferred in the circumstances of these cases. In my opinion both these contentions are unsustainable.

( 5 ) THE object of a notice under Section 80 is well, recognised. It is to acquaint the authorities mentioned in the section of the facts and circumstances which are said to necessitate the institution of the threatened suit and to afford them an opportunity to take stock of the situation and avoid litigation, if so advised, by settling the claim or making amends. The section is thus intended to grant to such authorities a special protection for their own benefit of which, if they so choose, they may avail It is also well established, and on the basis of this accepted purpose of section 80,

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