( 1 ) THIS second appeal filed by the defendant arises out of a suit for malicious prosecution. The suit has been decreed by both the Courts below.

( 2 ) THE only point, which has been argued in this appeal, is that the present suit having been instituted more than one year after the order of acquittal was barred by time.

( 3 ) A complaint under Sections 323/324/452, I. P. C. was filed by the defendant-appellant against the plaintiffs respondents on 8th June 1950. That complaint was dismiss ed and the plaintiffs were acquitted by an order dated 29th December, 1950. A revision against the order of acquittal was filed, which was dismissed on 31-8-1951. Thereafter the present suit was filed on 20-8-1952. The point for determination is whether the limitation in the case began to run from the order of acquittal passed on 29th December 1950 or from the order dated 31-8-1951 when the revision was dismissed.

( 4 ) I have heard learned counsel for the appellant. The respondents in this case are unrepresented. Under Article 23 of the Indian Limitation Act the period of limitation for a suit for compensation for malicious prosecution is one year from the date when the plaintiffs were acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated. In this case the question is when the plaintiffs should be deemed to have been acquitted, whether from the date of the order of dismissal of the complaint or from the date of the dismissal of the revision. The learned counsel in support of his view has relied upon the case of Madan Mohan Singh v. Ram Sunder Singn, 1930 All LJ 885 : (AIR 1930 all 326) and the case of Shankar Prasad v. Sheo Narain, AIR 1935 Oudh 392. These two authorities were not cited before the Courts below. The have relied upon the Full Bench case of the Madras High Court, Kulasekara Chetty v. Tholasingam Chetty, AIR 1938 Mad 349.

( 5 ) A perusal of Article 23 of the Limitation Act goes to show that that Article deals with two alternative cases one envisages acquittal and the other, termination of the prosecution. So far as the second alternative or the expression termination of the prosecution goes that is not applicable to the present case. That governs such cases as those of discharge. It is the first alternative which will govern the case of acquittal; and acquittal would mean acquittal from the trial Court or if there is conviction from a Trial Court, then the order of acquittal was passed in appeal or revision. In a case where acquittal has been ordered be the Trial Court and the complainant has filed revision, the filing of revision cannot affect the order of acquittal already passed. It will remain an order of acquittal till the acquittal is converted Into an order of sentence. It would thus appear that under Article 23 of the Limitation Act, the limitation would run from the date when the plaintiffs were acquitted by the Trial Court or in appeal if there was conviction from the Trial Court. Filing of a revisian against an order of acquittal cannot suspend the period of limitation, which start red, running from the date of the order of acquittal. This view is fully justified by the case of Shankar Prasad, AIR 1935 Oudh 392. In that case the prosecution of the plaintiff ended in acquittal. There was also a revision against the order of acquittal, and it was held by the learned Judge, who decided that case, that the limitation started running from the date of the order of acquittal and the filing of revision did not give a fresh start to the period of limitation; and so the suit, if brought more than one year after the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court would be beyond time. I respectfully agree with this view. The case of Madan Mohan Singh, 1930 All LJ 885 : (AIR 1930 All 326), was a case of discharge and so that case was covered by the second alternative of Article 23. But the Division Bench, which decided that case, also observed at p. 887 (of All L J) : (at p. 327 of AIR): "moreover in a case where the pro