( 1 ) I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment of my brother Brijlal Gupta. I agree with him that the date of signing the complaint was 1-6-1962 and that is the date on which the complaint was made. With great Inspect to him, I do not agree that it is optional for the Court not to record a finding of its being satisfied of the expediency even though it is satisfied about the expediency, but I agree that the non-recording of the satisfaction does not render the making of the complaint illegal. Signing the complaint amounts to making it; there is really one act caliecl differently. Sending the complaint to the Court concerned for trial is a different act and is of ministerial nature, for the reasons stated by me in my judgment in Mohd. Illayas v. State of U. P. , 1954 All U 241 : (AIR 1954 All 225), an appeal lies not from the finding about the expediency but from the making of the complaint, i. e. from the signing of the complaint. I further agree with my learned brother that the making of a complaint is an order within the meaning of section 419, Cr, P. C. , which requires an appeal to be accompanied by a copy of the order.

( 2 ) I have already given my reasons in detail for the view that limitation for an appeal in a case governed by Section 476, Cr. P. C. , commences on the date on which the complaint is signed or made, and I have nothing to add to them or to subtract from them.

( 3 ) I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother. Gupta, J.

( 4 ) THIS matter comes up before this Bench on an office report that the special appeals have been filed either 167 days cr 364 days beyond limitation depending upon whether the date from which the limitation Is to be computed is 22-12-1961 or 15-5-1961. The two starting points for the period of limitation have been mentioned In the office report, according to the conflicting decisions of learned single Judges of this Court in three cases viz. , 1954 All LJ 241 : (AIR 1954 all 225) and Jagan Prasad v. State, 1957 All LJ 17 in which it has been laid down that the starting point of limitation for an appeal under Section 476-B, Cr. P. C. , is the date on which the complaint is signed and the other view laid down in Ram Prasad Singh v. State, AIR 1959 All 529, that the starting point of limitation is the date of the recording of the finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into an offence referred to in section 195 (1), Clause (b) or (c) as required by Section 476, Cr. P. C.

( 5 ) THE finding as required by Section 476 was recorded by the Court on 15-5-1961 but the office report is wrong that the date of the signing of the complaint was 22-12-1961 on the basis of which the office computed the delay of 167 days according to the view in the two first mentioned decisions of this Court. I find from the record that an enquiry was addressed by learned counsel for the appellant to the office of this Court. In this enquiry two of the questions on which information was sought were

1. When was the complaint in the above case signed by the Registrar of the Court ? and 2. When was the aforesaid complaint sent to the Magistrate, Allahabad?

( 6 ) THE reply to these two enquiries was "1-6-1962 and 5-6-1962 respectively". It is, therefore clear that the date of the signing of the complaint was 1-6-1962 and not 22-12-1961. Accordingly the period of delay according to the view laid down in the first two decisions would be very much reduced and would be only about a week or even, less and not 167 days.

( 7 ) I may mention that this matter came before another Bench and that Bench by order dated 9-8-1962 directed) the Registrar to record a report stating clearly whether he signed the complaint in token of its completion on 22-12-1961 or 1-6-1962 but that report has not been recorded. It seems to me, however, that in view of the fact that on enquiry made from the office of the Court the office replied that the complaint was signed by the R