( 1 ) THIS revision by the decree-holder under Section 115 C. P. C. is directed against a judgment and decree of tha learned Civil Judge, Moradabad, whereby he upheld in appeal, a judgment and decree of a learned Munsif of that place, dismissing the execution application filed by the applicant.

( 2 ) IT appears that the applicant obtained a money decree against the opposite party from the court of the Judge, Small Causes. He got that decree transferred to the Court of Munsif, as he wanted to realise his amount by the attachment and sale of the opposite-partys immovable property, and some immovable property of the latter was also attached. Thereupon the judgment-debtor filed objections, inter alia, on the ground that having regard to the amended provisions of Section 42 C. P. C. the learned Munsif did not have the power to attach immovable "property for execution of the decree of the Court of judga Small Causes. The objection found favour with the Executing Court and the execution application was struck off. The applicant went "up in appeal to the lower appellate Court and the latter holding itself bound by the decision in Karam Chand v. Gur Dayal, 1960 All LJ 352 : (AIR 1960 All 512) affirmed the decision of the Executing Court and dismissed the appeal. Hence this application in revision by the decree-holder.

( 3 ) THE revision was originally heard by our brother Mithan Lal, who finding some difficulty in subscribing to the view taken by brother Dhawan in Karam Chand, 1960 All U 352 : [air 1960 all 512) (Ubi Supraj, referred this case to a larger Bench. It is in these circumstances that this application has come up before us for disposal.

( 4 ) FROM the facts stated above, it is clear that the short question involved in this case turns upon the construction of Section 42 C. P. C. (as amended in this Stata by the U. P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act in 1954 ). The said section after amendment referred to above reads thus:

"the Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same power in executing such decree as the Court which passed it: All persons disobeying or obstructing the execution of decree shall be punishable by such Court in the same manner as if it had passed the decree, and its order in executing such decree shall be subject to the same rules in respect of appeal as if the decree had been passed by itself. "

( 5 ) A plain reading of the aforesaid section shows that it invests the transferee Court, executing a decree, with the same power in executing that decree as the Court which passed it. This section, therefore, makes the power of the transferee Court in the matter of execution a decree conterminous with that of the transferring Court. Hence, if the transferring Court did not possess a power in executing a decree, the transferee Court would also not have that power Qua that decree. That this is the only interpretation which can be placed upon this section is further made clear by the wordings of the said section before its amendment. Under Section 42, as it originally stood, the transferee court had the same power in executing a decree transferred to it as if the said decree had been passed by itself. The fact that the Legislature used the expression as the court which passed it in place of, and not in addition to, the expression as if it had been passed by itself, clearly shows that it intended to equate the power of the transferee Court in the matter of executing a decree with that of the transferring Court.

( 6 ) THE construction which we have placed above is further borne out by the fact that where the legislature intended to preserve the power of the transferee Court in the matter of executing a decree transferred to it, it has specifically stated to that effect. See in this connection the last sentence of Section 42 which lays down that for purposes of appeal the orders of the transferee court would be subject to the same rules as though the decree had been passed by itself. The juxtapos