IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
A. N. Mulla and B. N. Nigam, JJ.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH - Appellant
Versus
RAM BILAS - Respondents
. . Of .
Decided On : 03/16/1961
CRIMINAL LAW - IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED - EVIDENCE ACT, S. 3 - IDENTIFICATION OF PROPERTY - EVIDENCE ACT, S. 9 - IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED AND PROPERTY - DISTINCTION - IDENTIFICATION OF PROPERTY - SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION IN FIRST INFORMATION REPORT - IDENTIFICATION OF PROPERTY - TEST OF RELIABILITY - IDENTIFICATION OF PERSON - TEST OF RELIABILITY - IDENTIFICATION OF PROPERTY - NUMBER OF SIMILAR ARTICLES TO BE MIXED - IDENTIFICATION OF PERSON - NUMBER OF SIMILAR PERSONS TO BE MIXED.
Fact of the Case:
In a dacoity case, the trial court acquitted the accused-respondents under Section 395, P. Code, due to the unreliability of identification by witnesses. The State appealed against the acquittal.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the trial court was justified in doubting the identification of witnesses who were not examined in the committing Magistrate's court. The court also held that the identification of property stands on a different footing than the identification of a person and that the trial court misdirected itself when it applied the principle laid down in Lalla Singh's case to the identification of property.
Issues: 1. Whether the identification of witnesses who were not examined in the committing Magistrate's court was reliable? 2. Whether the identification of property was sufficient? 3. Whether the trial court misdirected itself in applying the principle laid down in Lalla Singh's case to the identification of property?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court held that the identification of witnesses who were not examined in the committing Magistrate's court was not reliable, as it was not in accordance with the rule of law laid down in Lalla Singh's case and followed in other cases. 2. The court held that the identification of property was sufficient, as the description given in the first information report tallied completely with the article recovered and the slight discrepancy about the color was of no consequence. 3. The court held that the trial court misdirected itself in applying the principle laid down in Lalla Singh's case to the identification of property, as the identification of property stands on a different footing than the identification of a person.
Final Decision: The court upheld the order of acquittal passed by the trial court in favor of all the accused-respondents under Section 396, P. Code, and also maintained the order of acquittal passed by the trial court in favor of Shanti and Mulhey under Section 412, P. Code. However, the court set aside the acquittal of Ram Bilas under Section 412, P. Code, and convicted him under that section, sentencing him to five years rigorous imprisonment.
( 1 ) THIS is an appeal filed by the State in a dacoity case. The Additional Sessions Judge of Sitapur acquitted the fourteen accused respondents, who were prosecuted under Section 395. P. Code, but this decision aggrieved the State and it has filed this, appeal,
( 2 ) THE main ground on which the trial court acquitted the accused-respondents was that only two witnesses were examined before the committing Magistrate and the identification by one of these witnesses was totally unreliable. It ignored to take into consideration the identification by the other witnesses who were produced for the first time before the trial court in view of a Divisional bench decision of this Court in Lalla Singh v. The State, Cr. Appeal No. 29l of 1958, D/13- 12-1959 (All ). The Divisional Bench consisted of Mr. Justice James and one of us and the decision was dictated by Mr. Justice James. One of us who sat on that Bench concurred with that decision. It was observed in that decision: no witness of identification can be deemed reliable unless he is found to consistently identify an accused person in the jail and in the Courts of the Committing Magistrate and Sessions Judge, and day-to-day experience shows that not up often, a witness identifies a person in the jail and to the Session Court, but fails to do so in the Magistrates Court, with the result that his evidence is invariably rejected. No doubt the amended Code of Criminal Procedure does not compel the prosecution to examine every witness in Magistrates Court, nevertheless the prosecution take a big risk by withholding from Committing Magistrates Court witnesses whose testimony includes personal identification. Even though his identification of a given accused person may be correct in the jail and in the Sessions Court, I would consider it trustworthy rally if I find him identifying him in the Magistrates Court also. I am, therefore, not disposed to attaching any value. . . to the identification of a witness who had correctly identified the accused in jail and in Sessions, but who had not been produced before the committing Magistrate. It seems that this view was accepted in several decisions and then later on a contrary view was expressed and what is extraordinary about it is that this contrary view was also expressed by the same Judge whose view has been cited above. It is all the more amazing that when the learned judge gave a contradictory view, he did not refer to the earlier view expressed by him and did not indicate that for some reason the earlier view was not correct and he had changed his view. This view was expressed in Asharfi v. The State, AIR 1961 All 153, 1961 Crilj 340. The counsel for the accused in that case had contended that if an identifying witness is not produced in the Magistrates Court then the defence loses the reasonable possibility of contradicting the subsequent identification before the trial court by his failure to do so before the Committing Magistrate. The learned. Judges in Asharfis case AIR 1981 All 153 considered this argument and observed (p, 167 ). The argument is plausible and merits consideration. Now. the accused has a right to use a witnesss statement before the Committing Magistrate for contradicting him, and that right cannot be abridged, provided the legislature itself does not decide otherwise. But what has the legislature done? By introducing Section 207-A in the Code by Act No. XXVI of 1955 it has considerably altered the law relating to the procedure to be adopted in commitment Proceedings instituted on a police report, and by virtue of Clause (4) has given to the prosecution absolute discretion in the matter of production of eye-witnesses, and indeed this Bench has held in State v. Yasin, AIR 1958 All 861, 1958 Crilj 1449, that if in a particular case the prosecution do not choose to call a single eye-witness they cannot be compelled to do so. It is clear, therefore, that the legislature itself has conferred a power upon the pr
AI
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.