( 1 ) THE petitioner husband Banwari was murdered by the second and third respondents. They were tried under Section 802 read with Section 34 of the I. P. C; by the Sessions Judge, Meerut. By his judgment dated 5th November 1960 he sentenced them to death. They preferred am appeal against their conviction and sentence to this Court. Their appeal was dismissed on february 2, 1961 and the sentence of death was confirmed by the Court. During the course of arguments on appeal it appears that their counsel also tried to impress upon the court the advisability of commuting the sentence of death to a sentence of life imprisonment. The court refused to do so, because it found no extenuating feature. They then presented a petition to the governor for commuting their sentence of death to imprisonment for life. The Governor, by his order dated April 22, 1961 commuted the sentence of death to imprisonment for life. This petition is directed against the said order of the Governor.

( 2 ) THE relief claimed in the petition is that the Court should issue a writ in the mature of mandamus commanding the State of U. P. through its Chief Secretary to execute the order of the high Court regarding the sentence of death and treat the order of the Governor dated April 22, 1961 as a nullity.

( 3 ) AT the outset I would like to observe that the petitioner does not appear to me to possess requisite standing to move the Court. A person may invoke the aid of the Court under Article 228 of the Constitution for the enforcement of his or her fundamental rights or "for any other purpose1" The expression within quotation marks would suggest that the aid of the Court may also be invoked by a person for the protection of his or her ordinary legal rights, interests and privileges or for the prevention of legal wrongs or injuries to him or her. The impugned order does not" appear to me to violate or threaten to violate any right, interest or privilege of the petitioner, it does not also cause or threaten to cause any wrong or injury to her. She cannot accordingly invoke the aid of the Court under Article 226. No doubt the aforesaid respondents killed her husband; she was also a prosecution witness to the murder case. But these two circumstances do not lend her requisite interest to apply under Article 226 for the quashing of the impugned order.

( 4 ) FURTHER, I also entertain grave doubts whether the Court ought to issue at all a writ order or direction for indirectly devitalising an order which saves a man from the gallows. It is difficult to believe that those who enacted Article 226, had this object in mind. The petitioner would derive no legal benefit from the quashing of the impugned order; her anger alone may be satiated. But a writ, order or direction may not issue to satisfy sentiments. The court would do that at the cost of its judicial character.

( 5 ) THE validity of the impugned order would depend on Arts. 72, 73, 161 and 162 of the constitution and Sees. 402 and 402-A Cri P. C. Article 72 of the Constitution, in so far as it is material to the case, provides :

"72 (1) The President shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person, convicted of any offence -. . . . . . . (c) In all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death. (3) Nothing in Sub-clause (c) of Clause (1) shall affect the power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death exercisable by the Governor under any law for the time being in force. "

Article 73 of the Constitution, in so far as it is material reads : "73. Subject to the provisions of this Constitution the executive power of the Union shall extend. (a) to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws :"provided that the executive power referred to in Sub-clause (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in this Constitution or in any law made by Parliament, extend in any State to matters w