IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
S. N. Dwivedi, J.
RAM GOPAL - Appellant
Versus
JHAU LAL - Respondents
Civil Revn. 454 Of 1959
Decided On : 10/23/1961
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 - ORDER 22, RULE 2 - SUBSTITUTION OF LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES - NECESSARY PARTY - GIFT DEED - APPEAL - ABATEMENT - A person who has gifted away his property is not a necessary party to an appeal against a decree declaring the gift deed void.
Fact of the Case:
Hanuman Prasad, the last male owner of the house in dispute, executed two wills devising the property to his widow Mohan Dei, giving her a life interest. Mohan Dei gifted a portion of the house to Jhau Lal. Ram Gopal, the next presumptive reversioner of Hanuman Prasad, sued for a declaration that the gift deed was void on Mohan Dei's death. The Munsif granted the declaration but did not grant possession. Jhau Lal and Mohan Dei appealed. Mohan Dei died during the pendency of the appeal. Gur Prasad applied for substitution as a co-appellant, but he also died. Ram Gopal and Ram Lotan and Ram Shabad applied for substitution, but the appellate court rejected their applications.
Finding of the Court:
The appellate court held that Mohan Dei was not a necessary party to the suit and that the right to continue the appeal survived exclusively in Jhau Lal, the remaining appellant.
Issues: Whether Mohan Dei was a necessary party to the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that Mohan Dei was not a necessary party to the appeal because no relief could be claimed against her in respect of the portion of the house gifted by her to Jhau Lal and an effective decree against Jhau Lal could be passed even in her absence.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the revision applications and held that the right to prosecute the appeal exclusively survived in Jhau Lal.
( 1 ) ONE Hanuman Prasad was the last mate owner of the house in dispute. Hanuman Prasad, as alleged by the plaintiff applicant, had executed two wills by which he devised the disputed property in favour of his widow Mohan Dei. Under the wills she was given a life interest in the property. Mohan Dei, transferred a portion of the disputed house to Jhau Laf, the opposite party in these cases, by means of a gift deed. Ram Gopal then instituted a suit in the court of the munsif for a declaration that the gift deed in favour of Jhau Lal, not being justified by any legal necessity, was void on the death of Mohan Dei. He instituted the suit as the next presumptive reversicner of Hanuman Prasad. In the suit he impleaded Jhau Lal, the donee, and Mohan Dei, the donor, as defendants. The Munsif granted the declaration sought for. It may be mentioned here that Ram Gopal had also asked for a relief of possession, over the gifted property. The munsif did not grant that relief. Ram Gopal, however, did not prefer an appeal against that part of the decree of the Munsif. Jhau Lal and-Mohan Dei jointly filed an appeal against the decree of the Munsif granting a declaration to Ram Gopal that on the death of Mohan Dei the gift deed executed by her would be void. During the pendency of the appeal, Mohan Dei died on september 27, 1955. One Gur Prasad then made an application for being substituted in her place as a co-appellant of jhau Lal. But before his application could be disposed of, he also died on March 2, 1957. Then two applications were made to the court for substitution, one by Ram Gopal and the other by ram Lotan and Ram Shabad. They claimed to be substituted in place of Mohan Dei as co-appellant through the deceased Gur Prasad. The appellate court rejected the said two applications. It held that since Mohan Dei had gifted the property in suit to Jhau Lal, she was not a necessary party in the suit and that there could not accordingly arise any question of substitution in her place. It also held that the case was covered by the provisions of Rule 2, Order 22, of the C. P: C. , and that the right to continue the appeal survived exclusively in Jhau Lal, the remaining appellant.
( 2 ) I have heard learned counsel for the applicants in the two cases, but I am not satisfied that there is any such error in the judgment of the appellate court which would persuade me to exercise, my powers under Section 115 C. P. C. Further, I agree with the appellate court that mohan Dei was not a necessary party. In Banaras Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwandas, ILR (1946) All 891 : (AIR 1947 All 18), a Full Bench of our Court laid down two tests for deciding who is a necessary party. Those tests are; (1) that there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceedings in question, and (2) it should not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such party. Although the judgment of our Court in that case was not sustained by the Supreme Court in Deputy Commr. , Hardoi v. Rama Krishna narain, AIR 1953 SC 521, their Lordships of the Supreme Court affirmed the criteria laid down by our Court for deciding whether a certain person was a necessary party. Testing the present applications on the touch-stone of the two tests formulated by this Court, it is obvious that mohan Dei cannot be said to be a necessary party in the appeal. No relief could be claimed against her in respect of the portion of the house gifted by her to Jhau Lal. Again, an effective decree against Jhau Lal, who was in possession of the suit property, could be passed even in the absence of Mohan Dei or her heirs.
( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for Ram Gopal has relied upon the case of Poonam Chand v. Motilal, AIR 1954 Raj 287. In that case one Motilal had sold some property to Gulab Das and from Gulab Das that property eventually passed on to the respondents. The plaintiff instituted a suit against the respondents, and Motilal for possession o
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