( 1 ) THIS is a special appeal brought up on a permission granted by the learned Single Judge who dismissed the second appeal made to this Court.

( 2 ) THE appeal arises out of execution proceedings and is by the judgment-debtor.

( 3 ) ON the 18h of February, 1928 a compromise was effected between the plaintiff and the defendant. A decree on that compromise followed. The terms of the decree were that whenever the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 140/-to the defendant, the plaintiff would be put in possession of the property for which he had sued and that till such payment by the plaintiff of the sum of Rs. 140/- the defendant was to remain in possession of the property.

( 4 ) THE plaintiff let matters lie, inasmuch as, he did not trouble to make the payment of Rs. 140/to the defendant with the result that the defendant continued to be in possession as he was entitled to under the compromise decree. More than twelve years after the compromise decree the plaintiff paid Rs. 140/- into Court to the credit of the defendant and thereafter on the 21st of august 1944, he applied for execution of the decree. The plaintiff by the execution application sought possession over the property to which he was entitled under the compromise decree on condition that he made the payment of Rs. 140/ -. The judgment-debtor objected to the execution on the ground that the execution application was barred by time inasmuch as a period of more than twelve years had elapsed from the date of the decree to the date of the application. The courts below repelled the defendants objection. The defendant came up to this Court-in second appeal and the learned Single Judge held on a consideration of the language of the compromise that the plaintiff having been at liberty to make the payment at any time he chose and that his right to apply for execution accruing only after he had made the payment the execution application was not beyond time.

( 5 ) THE question that falls for determination is whether under the circumstances obtaining on the compromise which was effected between the parties and on the basis of which the decree of the 18th of February, 1928, was made there was any obligation on the part of the plaintiff to make the payment within any specified period or whether there was; any kind of obligation on him to make the payment within a reasonable time. The words of the compromise could leave no doubt in any ones mind that the plaintiff was under no such obligation, that is to say, the plaintiff was not under an obligation to make the payment within any specified time or any particular period. The plaintiff had, so to speak, a carte blanche in the matter of time for making the payment. On the compromise it is also clear that the defendants continuance on the property so long as the payment was not made by the plaintiff was to be treated as permissible under the decree--the defendants possession could not, under the circumstances, therefore be treated as adverse to the plaintiff. On neither of the two situations noticed above could any kind of obligation or cloud have rested on the plaintiffs right in respect of the property in dispute.

( 6 ) THE bar of limitation has to be a specific bar for we know that unless the right of a person is extinguished under some law or his right to obtain remedy from the Court is specifically barred or put in jeopardy by some provision of law, his right to relief from a court in respect of a right of his does not get destroyed. The plaintiff in this case had the right to obtain possession to making a payment of Rs. 140/ -. Under the compromise no limitaton in regard to the period of payment was placed on the plaintiff as we have already noticed. Therefore, his right to make the payment was without restriction, in regard to the period. His right to apply for possession in case the defendant did not willingly hand over possession to him accrued only after he made the payment.

( 7 ) ARTICLE 181 of the first schedule of th