( 1 ) THE simple question raised in this revision application is whether the complaint filed on 30-4-1958 for an offence under the Factories Act, 1948, the commission of which came to the notice of the Inspector on 31-1-1958, was "within three months of" the latter date or not. Under section 106 of the Factories Act no court can take cognizance of an, offence punishable under the Act unless complaint thereof is made "within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector. " if the period of three months is computed after excluding 31-1-1958, it is admittedly within three months, but if 31-1-1958 is taken to be the first day of the period of three months the complaint is admittedly not within three months. In B. P. Thakur v. State, 1959 All LJ 317 : (AIR 1959 All 787), I took the view that Section 12 of the Limitation Act applies, that consequently the date on which the offence came to the notice of the Inspector is to be excluded in computing the period, of three months and that even apart from Section 12 under the common law that day is to be excluded. Sri Jagdish Sarup asked me to reconsider the view taken by me; I have heard him but I am not persuaded to hold that the view is incorrect.

( 2 ) SRI Jagdish Sarup contended that Section 29 (2), Limitation Act, refers to a period of limitation prescribed for "any suit, appeal or application" and that a complaint such as that referred to in Section 106, Factories Act, is not a "suit, appeal or application". It may be granted that a complaint is not a suit or appeal but I see no reason to hold that it is not even an application. The word "application" has not been defined anywhere and has no technical meaning. It is defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary to mean "the action of making an appeal, request or petition to a person. " A complaint is nothing but a petition or request to a Magistrate to take notice of an offence committed by a certain person and to punish him after a trial. It is simply an application requesting a Magistrate to take certain action. Merely because the basis on which action is sought against a person is an accusation against him, a complaint does not cease to be an application.

( 3 ) THE next argument of Sri Jagdish Sarup was that the first limb of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 has no application in the present case because Section 106, Factories Act does not prescribe for a complaint,. e. , an application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule. There is no period of limitation prescribed for complaints by the First schedule. But for Section 106 of the Factories Act, there would have been no period of limitation within which a complaint must be filed. Because no period of limitation in prescribed for an application under Section 106, it was argued that the first limb does not apply. The first limb applies whenever a local or special Act prescribes a period of limitation different from that prescribed for it by the First Schedule. It is not essential that some period of limitation must be prescribed by the First Schedule before a period of limitation prescribed by a special or local Act can be held to be different. If no period for an application is prescribed by the First schedule, any period prescribed by a special or local Act must necessarily be different. Any period of limitation that is not the same as the period prescribed by the First Schedule must be different. If a period other than of three months is prescribed for a complaint by the First Schedule, the period of three months prescribed by Section 106 must be held to be different. Similarly if no period is prescribed for a complaint by the First Schedule the period prescribed by Section 106 must-be held to be different and the first limb of Sub-section (2) must be applied. If no period of limitation for a complaint is prescribed by the First Schedule it means tha