The Chancellor had no duty under Section 44 of the Lucknow University Act to constitute the arbitration tribunal, and the petitioner had an alternative remedy under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.

( 1 ) THE petitioner, Dr. Brij Mohan Sharma entered the service of the Lucknow University in october, 1933. For some time he worked as Lecturer. Later in 1948 he became a Reader and ultimately a Professor of Political Science in February, 1952. He also entered into an agreement with the University concerning his employment as a teacher of the University. On the 18th of march, 1936, his date of birth was recorded as 27th January, 1900. In 1956 the Executive Council of the University adopted a resolution providing that for the purposes of superannuation the age of a teacher as evidenced by the High School Certificate shall be accepted. According to such a certificate Dr. Sharmas date of birth would be 15th january, 1898, In April, 1957 the Executive Council whose attention had apparently been drawn to the difference in the two dates, the one recorded earlier in 1936,. e. , the 27th January, 1900, and the other as entered in the High School Certificate. e. , the 15th January, 1898, adopted a further resolution providing that the latter date shall be acted upon in the case of the petitioner. At the same time, it further decided that his employment shall continue upto the end of April, 1958. Dr. Sharma who apparently was not satisfied with this decision of the Executive Council wrote to the Chancellor stressing that his true date of birth was the 27th of January, 1900 and that he could not be superannuated earlier than the 27th of January, I960, This was done on the 12th November, 1958. A representation to the same effect had perhaps been separately made by him to the Vice-Chancellor of the University also. While the representation to the Chancellor was still undisposed of the Vice-Chancellor on the 24th December, 1958, decided in favour of accepting the 15th January, 1898, as his date of birth. The representation to the Chancellor also was later rejected on the 1st April, 1959. The prayer made in the above representation to the Chancellor was that an arbitration tribunal be appointed under Section 44 of the Lucknow University Act to decide the issues raised under the representation. The Chancellors reply which refused to grant the request of the petitioner was in view of it a refusal to appoint the tribunal contemplated by the above section. It is in this light that it has been treated by the parties also, though in giving his reasons for not appointing the tribunal the chancellor has refuted the correctness also of the claim preferred by the petitioner. But with this aspect of the matter this Court is not presently concerned in these proceedings. Before coming to this Court the petitioner twice represented to the Chancellor to review his decision communicated on the 1st of April, 1959, but these representations were turned down, the one on the 18th July, 1959 and the second on the 8th August, 1959. The relief claimed in the petition accordingly is a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the aforementioned three orders.

( 2 ) THE learned Advocate-General for the Chancellor has raised a preliminary objection which may be stated in two parts. One part is that Section 44 under which the Chancellor had been approached placed no duty upon him to appoint a tribunal, on the other hand, the section merely provided the manner of constitution of what has been called a tribunal of arbitration, consisting of three persons, one to be appointed by the Executive Council, another to be nominated by the officer or teacher aggrieved and an umpire to be appointed by the Chancellor. The Chancellor has no larger hand in the matter than the appointment of an umpire and it is to that extent alone that a legal obligation attaches to him. The setting up of the tribunal is the joint responsibility of all the three persons, viz. the teacher or the officer concerned, the Executive council and the Chancellor, and each is obliged independently of the other to perform his part of the duty. In other words Section 44 does not place any liability on