The permission granted under Section 3 of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act to file a suit for ejectment is not transferable to the landlord's successor-in-interest.

( 1 ) THIS is a tenants second appeal against a decree for ejectment. The appellant Sajjan Singh was the tenant of Smt. Jamini Bala Devi. The parties live in Mathura and the house in dispute is situate in that city and is subject to the provisions of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The lady obtained the permission of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura, under Section 3 of the Act to file a suit for the appellants ejectment. The permission was given on the ground that the lady needed the house for her own use, and this decision was confirmed in revision by the Commissioner on 21-1-1956. who also based its decision on the genuineness of the need of smt. Jamini Bala Devi.

( 2 ) AFTER obtaining permission, but before filing the suit for the eviction of the tenant, the lady partitioned her property between her four sons. The house in dispute was allotted to the share of sirohat Kumar Gangoli, plaintiff respondent No. 2. He filed the suit for eviction of the appellant, taking advantage of the permission obtained by his mother, the previous landlord.

( 3 ) THIS second appeal raises an important question whether the permission obtained by a landlord under Section 3 (1) of the U. P. Rent Control and Eviction Act to file a suit is transferable in favour of successor or transferee. In her application for permission to eject the appellant, Smt. Iamini Bala Devi alleged that (1) he was an undesirable tenant and (2) she required the premises occupied by him for her family and for her personal use. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura on 6-8-1954, after hearing the parties, held that he wag "satisfied. . . . . . that the need of the applicant is bona fide, but made no comment on her allegation against the conduct of Sajjan Singh as a tenant. He granted her permission to file a suit. On 8-10-1955, the appellant Sajjan Singh was served with a notice requiring him to vacate the accommodation. The appellant Sajjan Singh filed a revision against this order which was dismissed by the commissioner on 21-1-1956. Eight months later, on 20-9-1956, the lady partitioned her property and transferred the allotted shares to her sons. Th accommodation in dispute was given to Sirohat kumar Gangoli, plaintiff respondent No. 2, who became its owner and landlord on that date. In the suit for ejectment filed both the previous owner Smt. Jamini Bala Devi and the new owner sirohat Kumar Gangoli were co-plaintiffs, but it was conceded by learned counsel for the respondent during this appeal that no suit could be filed by the lady after she had ceased to be the landlord. The suit was contested by the appellant, who contended, inter alia, that the suit was not maintainable as the permission obtained by Jamini Bala Devi did not entitle her transferee to file a suit. It was also contended that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act purporting to terminate the tenancy was invalid as it was unsigned, Both the courts rejected all the contentions of the appellant and decreed the suit for ejectment. A decree for arrears of rent was also passed. The defendant has now come to this Court in second appeal against the decree for ejectment only.

( 4 ) MR. Barman, learned counsel for the appellant, urged only two arguments against the validity of the decree. First, he contended that the decision of the lower appellate court that the permission obtained by the previous landlord enured for the benefit of the transferee landlord was wrong. Secondly, he argued that the finding of the lower appellate court that the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was valid is also erroneous.

( 5 ) THE first contention raises the question whether the permission granted under Section 3 (1)confers on the landlord a personal right to file a suit for the ejection of the tenant or is transferable to his heir, or assignee or transferee.

( 6 ) IT was conceded by learned counsel for both the parties that there is no direc