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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Harish Chandra and Chandiramani, JJ.
R.N.SETH - Appellant
Versus
GIRJA SHANKER SRIVASTAVA - Respondents
Second Appeal 460 Of 1948
Decided On : 03/02/1950
RENT CONTROL AND EVICTION ACT, 1947 - SECTION 3 - DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY - DISTRICT MAGISTRATE - RENT CONTROL AND EVICTION OFFICER - POWER TO CANCEL ORDER - SECTION 21, U. P. GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1904 - INTERPRETATION - SECTION 16, RENT CONTROL AND EVICTION ACT, 1947 - APPLICABILITY - SUMMARY: The District Magistrate has the power to delegate his functions under Section 3 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947, to another officer, and such delegation does not divest the District Magistrate of his authority to perform those functions. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer is not an agent of the District Magistrate, and the District Magistrate does not have the power to cancel an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. Section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, which authorizes the amendment or rescission of notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws, does not apply to orders passed by the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947. Section 16 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947, which bars the questioning of orders made under the Act in any court, does not apply to orders passed by the District Magistrate that are not authorized by the Act.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a tenant, challenged the maintainability of a suit for ejectment filed against him by the respondent, the landlord, on the ground that the permission granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for the institution of the suit was subsequently revoked by the District Magistrate.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the District Magistrate had the power to delegate his functions under Section 3 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947, to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, and that such delegation did not divest the District Magistrate of his authority to perform those functions. The court further held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not an agent of the District Magistrate, and that the District Magistrate did not have the power to cancel an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The court also held that Section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, did not apply to orders passed by the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947, and that Section 16 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947, did not apply to orders passed by the District Magistrate that were not authorized by the Act.
Issues: 1. Whether the District Magistrate had the power to delegate his functions under Section 3 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947, to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 2. Whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was an agent of the District Magistrate. 3. Whether the District Magistrate had the power to cancel an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 4. Whether Section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, applied to orders passed by the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947. 5. Whether Section 16 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947, applied to orders passed by the District Magistrate that were not authorized by the Act.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court relied on the definition of "District Magistrate" in Section 2(d) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947, which includes an officer authorized by the District Magistrate to perform any of his functions under the Act, to hold that the District Magistrate had the power to delegate his functions under Section 3 of the Act to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 2. The court relied on the judgment in Huth v. Clarke, (1890) 23 Q. B. D. 391, to hold that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was not an agent of the District Magistrate. 3. The court relied on the absence of any express statutory provision authorizing the District Magistrate to cancel an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to hold that the District Magistrate did not have the power to do so. 4. The court relied on the language of Section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904, which authorizes the amendment or rescission of notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws, to hold that it did not apply to orders passed by the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947. 5. The court relied on the language of Section 16 of the Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1947, which bars the questioning of orders made under the Act in any court, to hold that it did not apply to orders passed by the District Magistrate that were not authorized by the Act.
Final Decision: The court dismissed the appeal and the cross-objection, and discharged the order staying the execution of the decree.
( 1 ) THIS is a second appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge of lucknow reversing in part the judgment and decree of the Munsif, North Lucknow, dismissing the respondents suit against the appellant for arrears of rent and ejectment from a certain house. The lower appellate Court decreed the respondents suit for ejectment but dismissed it with respect to the claim for arrears of rent. The appellant has come up in second appeal to this Court.
( 2 ) THE only questions that arise in this appeal are of law. Admittedly the appellant is the tenant of the respondent in the house in dispute. The respondent gave him the requisite fifteen days notice as required under Section 106, T. P. Act, 1882 and produced evidence of his having been given the necessary permission by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of Lucknow under Section 3, u. P. Control and Eviction Act, 1947, for the institution of the suit. The fact that such permission was given by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer of Lucknow on 28-4-1947, before the institution of the suit is not denied. The appellants contention is that the permission given by the rent Control and Eviction Officer was subsequently revoked by the District Magistrate, lucknow, by an order dated 24-7-1947, and that the suit is, therefore, not maintainable, having regard to the provisions of Section 3 of Act III [3] of 1947. It will be noted that under that section no suit for ejectment except on one or more of the ground mentioned in Clauses (a) to (f)of that section can be instituted without the permission of the District Magistrate. The appellants further contention, however, is that no suit against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation can be instituted except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a)to (f) of that section and that too with the previous permission of the District Magistrate. According to the findings of the Court below none of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) to (f)of this section exists in the present case and if this further contention of learned counsel for the appellant is accepted the suit is not maintainable. Reliance is placed on the case of Bhagat Singh bugga and Co. v. Mrs. Gangotri Devi, A. I. R. 1949 Oudh 11 decided by a single Judge of the Oudh chief Court. In another unreported case of the Oudh Chief Court, Gokaran Nath Yajnik v. Sheo ram Upadhyaya, S. A. No. 636 of 1947, D/- 11-9-1947, however, a different view was taken and it was held that it was only in cases which were not covered by Clauses (a) to (f) of the section that the permission of the District Magistrate was necessary before the institution of a suit for the eviction of a tenant. The Allahabad High Court has in a later case taken the same view. It will be noted that subsequently the U. P. Legislature passed an Act, the U. P. (Temporary) Control of rent and Eviction (Amendment) Act, 1948, Section 10 of which makes it clear that under section 3 of the Act
"no permission of the District Magistrate is or be deemed to ever have been necessary for filing of a suit for eviction against a tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in Clauses (a) to (f) of the said section. "
It is contended that this section is ultra vires the U. P. Legislature and reliance is placed upon the case of Amar Nath v. Firm Chotelal Durgaprasad, A. I. R. 1938 ALL. 593 (F. B.), in which it was said that the functions of a Legislature are not to declare the law but to enact provisions of the law. " The power of the legislature to pass an Act of a declaratory nature with a retrospective operation is universally accepted : vide Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Edn. 8, p. 196. Section 10 of the amending Act cannot, therefore, be regarded as ultra vires the U. P. Legislature and, in my view, in Amarnaths case there was no intention to lay down anything to the contrary. But as I have just pointed out the language used in Section 3 itself makes the intention quite cle
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