1950 Supreme(All) 43
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Raghubar Dayal, J.
BRAHMDUTT - Appellant
Versus
STATE - Respondents
Criminal Revn. 285 Of 1950
Decided On : 02/21/1950
KRIPA SHANKAR SINHA, SAMBHU SHARAN
Headnote:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1898 - SECTION 351 - DISCHARGE - ORDER OF MAGISTRATE REFUSING TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST ACCUSED ON APPLICATION OF PROSECUTING INSPECTOR - NOT AMOUNT TO DISCHARGE - ORDER OF DISTRICT MAGISTRATE TRANSFERRING CASE TO ANOTHER COURT - NOT INVALID.
Fact of the Case:
The applicant, Brahmdutt, was a witness in a case under Section 409, Penal Code, against Lalta Prasad and Banarsi Das. The Prosecuting Inspector moved the Court to proceed against Brahmdutt also in that case, but the prayer was rejected. Subsequently, the case was transferred to another Court by the District Magistrate. Brahmdutt challenged the transfer of the case against him, arguing that the order of the City Magistrate refusing to take action against him amounted to a discharge under Section 351, Criminal Procedure Code.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the order of the City Magistrate refusing to take action against Brahmdutt did not amount to a discharge. The Court observed that Section 351, Criminal Procedure Code, is just an enabling section authorising the criminal Court to detain any person who attends the Court for the purposes of an enquiry into or trial of any offence. The City Magistrates refusing to take action, when moved by the Prosecuting Inspector to take action Under Section 351, Criminal P. C. , against Brahmdutt, does not, to my mind, amount to a discharge of Brahmdutt, who was never summoned to appear as an accused, or was treated as an accused.
Issues: Whether the order of the City Magistrate refusing to take action against the applicant on the application of the Prosecuting Inspector amounted to an order of discharge.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that the order of the City Magistrate refusing to take action against Brahmdutt did not amount to a discharge. The Court observed that Section 351, Criminal Procedure Code, is just an enabling section authorising the criminal Court to detain any person who attends the Court for the purposes of an enquiry into or trial of any offence. The City Magistrates refusing to take action, when moved by the Prosecuting Inspector to take action Under Section 351, Criminal P. C. , against Brahmdutt, does not, to my mind, amount to a discharge of Brahmdutt, who was never summoned to appear as an accused, or was treated as an accused.
Final Decision: The Court rejected the application challenging the transfer of the case against Brahmdutt.
( 1 ) THIS is an application in revision against the order of the Sessions Judge of Mirzapur confirming the order of the District Magistrate, Mirzapur, transferring the case against Lalta prasad and Banarsi Das from the Court of the City Magistrate to the Court of Shri S. L. Nigam, judicial Magistrate, and transferring the case against Brahmdutt, applicant, to that Court in the following circumstances.
( 2 ) A case Under Section 409, Penal Code, was proceeding against Lalta Prasad and Banarsi Das in the Court of the City Magistrate. The applicant Brahmdutt was a witness in that case. After he had been examined, the Prosecuting Inspector moved the Court to proceed against Brabmdutt also in that case. This prayer was rejected.
( 3 ) SUBSEQUENTLY on the application of Lalta Prasad and Banarsi Das that case was transferred by the District Magistrate on 1st August 1949 to the Court of Shri S. L. Nigam. The reasons, which influenced the District Magistrate to transfer the case, were that the police was going to submit a charge sheet against Brahmdutt as well, and that if the case be transferred to another Court that court would proceed de novo against all the accused, namely, Lalta Prasad, Banarsi Das and brahmdutt.
( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY a charge sheet against Brahmdutt was filed. It was also transferred to that Court by the District Magistrate on 5th August 1949.
( 5 ) I do not see any reason why Brahmdutta has a grievance against the transfer of the case of lalta Prasad and Banarsi Das. Those accused wanted the transfer of their case. The transfer was not objected to on behalf of the State. A third person has no right to object to the transfer of a case. He may, in certain circumstances, be considered to be an interested party. Even then his objection to the transfer of the case will not get precedence over the desires of the two main parties to the case, namely the accused and the State. The interest which the applicant had at the time when the District Magistrate ordered the transfer of the case on 1st August could not be more than the interest of an ordinary witness. He was not even the complainant. Of course, any person can bring facts to the notice of this Court for it to take action in revision or for transferring any case, but that does not mean that every person has any right to claim transfer of a case or to object to the transfer of a case. I need not say anything about the merits of the order of the District Magistrate transferring the case from the Court of the City Magistrate to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate.
( 6 ) THE District Magistrate transferred the ease against Brahmdutt to the same Court. The main contention in this connection is that the case against Brahmdutt cannot proceed after the City magistrate had rejected the prayer of the Prosecuting Inspector to proceed against Brahmdutt in the same case against Lalta Prasad and Banarsi Das. It is contended that the order of the City magistrate amounted to a discharge in view of the provisions of Section 351, Criminal P. C. I do not agree. Section 351, Criminal P. C. , is just an enabling section authorising the criminal Court to detain any person who attends the Court for the purposes of an enquiry into or trial of any offence. The City Magistrates refusing to take action, when moved by the Prosecuting Inspector to take action Under Section 351, Criminal P. C. , against Brahmdutt, does not, to my mind, amount to a discharge of Brahmdutt, who was never summoned to appear as an accused, or was treated as an accused. It does not appear that he was even present on 15th July 1949 when the prosecuting Inspector applied to summon him as an accused.
( 7 ) I am referred to the case of Ajab Lal v. Emperor, 32 Cal 783 : (2 Cr. L. J. 524), in support of the contention that the order of the City Magistrate refusing to take action against the applicant on the application of the Prosecuting Inspector amounted to an order of discharge. In that case a magistra