( 1 ) THIS is a petition under Article 226 o the Constitution impugning the legality of certain proceedings initiated by the State Transport Authority, Lucknow, against the petitioner by means of a notice calling upon him to show cause why a permit granted to him by the Regional transport Authority, Kumaun Region, should not be revised by the State Transport Authority. The facts, as stated in the affidavit supporting the petition, are these. The petitioner firm was sanctioned a private carriers permit by the Regional Transport Authority, Ku-maun Region by a resolution dated 16-8-1956, In pursuance of this resolution a private carriers permit was actually issued to the petitioner on 15-10-1956. It appears that the petitioner continued in uninterrupted enjoyment of the rights and privileges under this permit for more than a year. But on 10-2-1958, he received a notice referred to above. The date of the notice is 6-2-1958. The petitioner sent a reply to the notice denying the allegations made in the notice. It is not necessary to give a detailed account of what transpired before the State Transport Authority after the petitioner firm had filed its explanation in response to the notice.

( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by the initiation of the nroceed-ings for the revision of its permit the petitioner has come to this court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

( 3 ) THE replication is opposed by the State on whose behalf a counter affidavit has been sworn by the Assistant Transport Commissioner (Administration) Lucknow. It is also opposed by the ku-maun Motor Owners Union, which was given special permission to do so, on an application made by it and allowed by the court under Chapter XXII, Rule 5 of the Rules of this Court.

( 4 ) THE case on behalf of the petitioner Com- pany and on behalf of the respondents was argued with ability respectively by Mr. B. N. Katju. Mr. R. S. Pathak and Mr. N. D. Pant, Mr. B. N. Katjus arguments were these; The State Transport Authority had issued this notice under Section 64-A of tha Motor Vehicles Act which came into effect on 16-2-1957. But the order which that authority seeks to revise was passed long before the enactment of the Section. According to Mr. B. N. Katju the new Section gives no power to the State Transport Authority to revise any orders which hud been passed and had become final before the date of the commencement of this section. Mr. B, N. Katju further argued that, even if it is conceded that the revisional power of that Authority extends to orders passed before the passing of the Section, it does not include the power to take fresh evidence and convert itself into a tribunal of original jurisdiction. The State transport Authority could only look into the record as it is and decide whether the order of the lower tribunal is improper or illegal. Thirdly, he contended that the State Transport Authority could not, in the exercise of this new re-visional jurisdiction, issue a notice on the petitioner virtually calling upon it to show cause why the permit should not be revised on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud or mis-representation. He relied on the title of the notice (Anne-xure a to the petitioners affidavit) which is: "subject:-- Notice u/s. 60d of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939". Mr. B. N. Katju also contended that the notice is vague and ambiguous as it does not make clear whether the petitioner is being proceeded against under Section 60d* or under Section 64-A of the Act. Both these Sections are mentinned in the notice, the first in the title and the second in the body of the notice.

( 5 ) AS stated above, Mr. B. N. Katjus arguments were answered at great length by Messrs Pathak and Pant. But it is necessary for me to cover the entire ground raised at the bar, for I am satisfied, on a reading of this notice, that it is both vague and ambiguous and has in fact misled the petitioner. On a previous day learned counsel tor the state (not Mr. Pant) stated, on a questio