1958 Supreme(All) 204
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
A. N. Mulla, J.
SATYA NARAIN SINHA - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH - Respondents
Criminal Revn. 318 Of 1958
Decided On : 11/14/1958
Shankar Sahai, Tej Narain
Headnote:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 240 - WITHDRAWAL OF CHARGES - STAY OF PROCEEDINGS - DISTINCTION - EFFECT OF STAY - NOT AN ACQUITTAL.
Fact of the Case:
The applicant was convicted and sentenced for criminal misappropriation for a specific period. The trial court did not proceed with the trial for the remaining period included in the original charge. After the applicant's appeal was dismissed, the prosecution sought to revive the second prosecution after a lapse of more than 2 1/2 years.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the stay of proceedings by the trial court did not amount to a withdrawal of charges under Section 240, Cr.P.C., and therefore, did not operate as an acquittal. The court also held that the delay in reviving the second prosecution was a circumstance to be considered by the trial court in determining the sentence, if the charges were proved.
Issues: 1. Whether the stay of proceedings by the trial court amounted to a withdrawal of charges under Section 240, Cr.P.C., and therefore, operated as an acquittal. 2. Whether the delay in reviving the second prosecution was a ground to quash the proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The court interpreted Section 240, Cr.P.C., and held that the word "withdrawal" used in the section did not include a stay made by the court. The court reasoned that the Legislature used two different words, "withdrawal" and "stay," to describe the termination of proceedings by two different authorities, and therefore, the stay of proceedings by the court could not be equated with a withdrawal of charges by the State. 2. The court held that the delay in reviving the second prosecution was a circumstance to be considered by the trial court in determining the sentence, if the charges were proved. The court observed that the applicant was prejudiced by the delay, as he could not be given concurrent sentences if he was convicted in the second trial.
Final Decision: The court rejected the application to quash the proceedings, but directed the trial court to consider the adequacy of the punishment already undergone by the applicant in determining the sentence, if he was found guilty.
( 1 ) THIS is an application under Section 561-A, Cr. P. C. in which it is prayed that the proceedings in the Sessions Trial No. 52/1 of 1953 may be quashed as the applicant has been acquitted and unless a fresh commitment is made the trial cannot proceed.
( 2 ) THERE are two aspects which have been presented before met. The first contention has been that when the original commitment was made, the trial Court amended the charge and prosecuted the applicant only for a specific period and this amounted to his staying the prosecution of the applicant in respect of the other period and on a correct interpretation of Section 240, Cr. P. C, this stay amounts to an order of acquittal, The other, contention advanced before me is that this second prosecution is now sought to be revived after a lapse of more than 2 1/2 years and this amounts to a persecution and the Courts should not permit the prosecuting agency to persecute the applicant in this manner.
( 3 ) I will take up the first contention. When the Magistrate committed this case, he framed a charge and he stated in this charge that criminal misappropriation was committed by the applicant between October 1951 and March 1953 and the total amount of money which was criminally misappropriated was Rs. 16,904-6-0. The charge framed by the Magistrate was obviously defective for under the Criminal Procedure Code even after utilising the provisions of section 222 (2) a charge relating to a period of more than one year could not have been framed. The Sessions Judge therefore, had to amend this charge and he very rightly framed a charge relating to a period between 16-5-1952 and 6-4-1953. The result was that the total amount of misappropriated money also decreased from Rs. 16,904/-and odd annas to Rs. 8,319/- and odd annas. The applicant was convicted and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 8,000/-The Sessions Judge after convicting him in this case did not proceed to try the applicant for the misappropriation committed by him in the remaining period which was included in the charge framed by the Magistrate. The applicant went up in appeal, but his appeal was dismissed with the modification that the fine of rs. 8,000/- was reduced to a fine of Rs. 5,000/ -. The appellate Court dismissed this appeal on 12-7-1957. The trial Court had convicted him on 17-11-1955, and it was in May 1958 that the prosecuting agency again presented a petition before the Sessions Judge, Lucknow, that the applicant should be prosecuted for the misappropriation committed by him between October 1951 and May, 1952. The Sessions Judge granted this prayer and transferred this case for disposal to an Additional sessioas Judge. The applicant made a prayer before the Additional Sessions Judge that his prosecution will not be legal and, therefore it should be quashed. "the Additional Sessions Judge observed that the case has been transferred to him by the Sessions Judge and, therefore, he has no option, but to proceed with the trial of the case. The applicant then came up before this Court and presented this application.
( 4 ) IT would be seen from the history given above that after the applicant was convicted on, 17-11-1955, neither the Court tried the applicant nor the prosecution made any prayer that the applicant should be made to stand a second trial for the offence committed by him during that period which was not covered in the first trial. It is contended before me that an inference should be drawn from this conduct that both the Court and the prosecution were satisfied that the applicant has been adequately punished in the first trial and, therefore it was neither desirable nor necessary to proceed with the second trial. I am inclined to agree with this contention. The very fact that even after the appeal was dismissed by the High Court the prosecuting agency took ten months to file a fresh application indicates that it was at a very late stage that the prosecution decide