( 1 ) KHUSHI Ram appellant has been convicted under Section 7 (i) and 7 (iii) of the Prevention of food Adulteration Act by the Additional Sessions Judge of Bara Banki and sentenced to one years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200/- in default further rigorous imprisonment for six months under each count. The two sentences of imprisonment awarded to Khushi Ram have been made to run concurrently.

( 2 ) IT is not necessary to give the facts of the case at all, as I have come to the conclusion that the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge was without jurisdiction and the case is being remanded for retrial before a competent Magistrate. I now proceed to discuss only the legal aspect involved in this case.

( 3 ) THE Magistrate committed tins case to the Court of Session by his order dated the 24th July, 1956, under a misapprehension. The Magistrate observed:

"therefore it will be seen that this is the third offence which has been committed by the accused. The punishment which is laid down in this is as follows: in Section 16 (i), fiii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for a third and subsequent offences, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to four years and with fine: provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be mentioned in the judgment of the court, such imprisonment shall not be less than 2 years and such fine shall not be less than three thousand rupees. as I have only power to fine up to Rs. 2000/-only and in this case the minimum fine to be awarded is Rs. 3000/- only, so I am committing this case, to the Court of Sessions on the-charges under Section 7 (i) and 7 (iii) read with Section 16 (1) (a) and (iii) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act under Section 346 Cr. P. C. "

( 4 ) THE first error, committed by the Magistrate was that he depended upon a provision of the code of Criminal Procedure for committing the case to the Court of Session which did not empower him to do so. Section 346 only empowers a Magistrate to stay proceedings when the evidence appears to him to warrant a presumption that the case should be committed for trial to the Sessions Court or be tried by some other Magistrate and he can only submit a report explaining the nature of the case to the Magistrate to whom he is subordinate. He cannot commit the case to the Court of Session. Perhaps the Magistrate intended to act under Section 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers him to make such a commitment if he for some valid reason felt that the case ought to be tried by the Court of Session. Where a Magistrate cannot pass an adequate sentence upon an offender looking to the gravity of the offence and the requirements of law, it it a valid reason for making such a commitment. But in this case when the Magistrate passed this order, he also completely overlooked the provisions of Section 21 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration act. Section 21 reads as follows:

"notwithstanding anything contained in Section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898), it shall be lawful for any Presidency Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class to pass any sentence authorised by this Act, in excess of his powers under Section 32 of the said Code,"

This section makes it abundantly clear that the normal limitations placed upon the powers of the magistrates are removed and for the purposes of the prevention of Food Adultration Act he can pass all the sentences mentioned in that Act when he finds an accused person guilty. It is surprising that the Sessions Judge also did not see the provisions of Section 21 quoted above. Perhaps, if he had done so he would not have proceeded to assume jurisdiction but would have remanded the case back to the Magistrate. Section 21 makes it quite obvious that the trial is to be conducted by a Magistrate and in no circumstances the case is to be committed to the Court of Session on the ground that an adequate sentence