The court has jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of an agreement or compromise pleaded under Order XXIII, Rule 3, including allegations of fraud or undue influence.

( 1 ) THE facts revealed in this revision are briefly as follows:

( 2 ) THE plaintiff Mohammad Raza, who is the opposite party, brought a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against Smt. Shujarat, his wife. After the suit had proceeded for sometime an application was presented on behalf of the defendant applicant that the dispute in the suit had been adjusted between the parties by a compromise reached between them, and that according to the compromise the defendant had been divorced by the plaintiff. A writing was also produced which, according to the defendant, the plaintiff had executed. It was Ex. A-1 and was in the nature of a deed of divorce. The plaintiff disowned this document and urged that his signatures had been taken on a blank sheet of paper which later appeared to have been dishonestly utilized by the opposite party to forge the above document There was thus very specific and definite denial" by the plaintiff that he ever entered into any agreement divorcing Srimati Shujarat, or that the document which purported to have been made by him was ever executed by him in fact.

( 3 ) THE trial Court went into the question, after taking necessary evidence whether the husband had in fact agreed to divorce the wife and whether the deed of divorce was executed by him. The trial Court found in favour of the plaintiff that he had not entered into any such agreement or adjustment. The Appellate Court also came to the same conclusion.

( 4 ) THE allegation by the plaintiff so far as the deed of divorce relied upon by the wife was concerned, was that after filing the suit he had been called by his father-in-law who was defendant No. 2, to Taligram for settling the dispute. He went there and was told by the father-in-law that he could take his wife with him provided he executed an agreement that he would send her to his place whenever so desired by him, and would also keep her comfortably. He agreed to the above suggestion of his father-in-law who then asked him to get a stamp paper. The plaintiff brought the stamp paper and gave it to his father-in-law, but as it was getting late to catch the train he was assured by his father-in-law that he would get the necessary document scribed on it. He was also asked to affix his signature on the blank sheet to which, he readily agreed, particularly as there was little time left for the departure of the train and he was anxious to leave with his wife.

( 5 ) IT would appear from the above allegations that according to the plaintiff there was never any agreement to divorce; on the other hand, all that he had agreed to was that he Would maintain his wife, treat her well, and send her to her parents home whenever so desired by them. The defendants case, on the other hand, was that there was in fact an agreement divorcing her and the document, the deed of divorce, was in fact executed by the plaintiff as such a deed.

( 6 ) IT was to record the above adjustment, which according to the defendant had been reached by the plaintiff with her, that the application under Order XXIII, Rule 3 had been made. Both the courts accepted the plaintiffs version and found that there was never any adjustment as pleaded by the defendant. The application under Order XXIII, Rule 3 by the defendant was accordingly" dismissed. The present revision is directed against the order of the lower Court refusing to record the adjustment pleaded by the wife.

( 7 ) THIS revision originally came up for hearing before one of us. It was pointed out then on, behalf of the applicant that the enquiry under Order XXIII, Rule 3 was a limited one, and it was not open to the Courts below to go into the question of fraud. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court reported in Husain Yar Beg v. Radha Kishan, AIR 1935 All 137 (A ). Reference was also made to another decision reported in Union of India v. S. Raghubir Saran, 1956 All LJ 825: (AIR 1957 All 120) (B) in which the view expressed in the earlier case was doubted. I