RANDHIR SINGH, J.

( 1 ) THIS appeal pending in the court of the District Judge Bahraich, has been withdrawn by an order of this Court under Article 228 of the Constitution for determination of the question whether Section 3 of U. P. Act XV of 1952, and Section 3 of U. P. Act XXXI of 1952 are valid.

( 2 ) IT appears that the applicant No. 1 Karam Singh obtained a lease from applicant No. 2 Sardar karam Singh in respect of some plots of land with an aggregate area of Section 273 acres on 15-4-1952. This land was entered, according to the allegations of the applicants, as Khudkasht of applicant no. 2 in the papers. On 29-7-1952 after the vesting, a suit wag instituted by applicant no. 1 against opposite party No. 1 for the possession of two plots of land Nos. 1112/2 and 1115/1 on the allegations that opposite party No. 1 was in wrongful possession of these plots of land, which had been leased out to the applicant No. 1 by the applicant No. 2, who was before the vesting the landlord of the land in dispute.

( 3 ) THE suit was resisted by opposite party No. 1 on two grounds. Firstly, it was alleged that opposite party No. 1 had been in possession of the land since 1947 and was in-actual possession of it in the year 1359 Fasli. He was, therefore, not liable to ejectment in view of the provisions of u. P. Act XXXI of 1952. It was also contended on behalf of opposite party No. 1 that the lease obtained by Karam Singh, applicant No. 1, was inoperative inasmuch as the registration of the lease was made on 9-6-1952 after the appointed date mentioned in Act XV of 1952, and the applicant did not obtain any rights under the lease relied upon by him.

( 4 ) APPLICANT No. 1, however, challenged the validity of both the Acts on which reliance was placed by opposite party No. 1, namely, Act No. XV of 1952 and Act No. XXXI of 1952. It was urged on behalf of applicant No. 1 that the defendant did not obtain any title in the disputed plots on the score of his possession in 1359 Fasli as the Act which granted opposite party No. 1 these rights was invalid and offended against the provisions of the Constitution. He also urged that Act no. XV of 1952, which required the registration to be done before 21-5-1952, was also invalid and could not affect the validity of the lease relied upon by him.

( 5 ) THE learned Munsif, who tried the suit, came to the conclusion that the Acts challenged by the applicant No. 1 as invalid were Intra vires of the legislature and did not infringe the Constitution. Applicant No. 1 then went up in appeal before the District Judge and it was after the institution of the appeal that an application was made by the applicants to this Court for the withdrawal of this appeal from the court of the District Judge for the determination of the points referred above.

( 6 ) THE main contention on behalf of the applicants is that Act XXXI of 1952 deprived the applicants of their rights in the property without any compensation having been given to them and any law of, this nature would be void under the provisions of the Constitution. Reliance has been placed on the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution as it stood before the fourth Amendment to the Constitution was made and it has been argued that prior to the Fourth amendment of the Constitution no law which did not provide for compensation or which did not lay down principles for the determination of compensation could be valid if it deprived a person of his property, or by means of which, acquisition or requisitioning of the property of a person could be made by the State. There is no doubt that under the law as interpreted before the Fourth amendment to the Constitution, no distinction was made between a law which resulted in deprivation of property or by means of which, acquisition or requisitioning could be made and in both these cases provision had to be made for payment of compensation. As a necessary corollary any law which did not provide for compensation but deprived a su